9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
290.
The Chiefs of
Staff were content that these provisions “but no less” were
sufficient
to allow
the UK military to complete its tasks. Mr Hutton and ACM
Stirrup therefore
recommended
that Mr Brown agree with Prime Minister Maliki that UK forces
should
complete
their mission in Iraq on that basis. The MOD would need to review
the position
if the text
of the draft law changed as it proceeded through the Iraqi
Parliament.
291.
The draft law
on immunities meant that UK forces were exempt from
Iraqi
justice
unless they committed a crime “off-base and with intent or as a
result of gross
negligence”.
Anyone captured by this would remain in UK custody. This
was:
“… less
than the US have secured through their Status of Forces Agreement,
but
UK forces
are not doing the same range of tasks, are far fewer in number and,
on
current
plans, will complete our key tasks and withdraw the vast majority
of troops
by 31 July
2009.”
292.
The
accompanying Exchange of Letters constituted an “invitation” from
the
Government
of Iraq to complete the UK tasks.
293.
The two main
remaining risks were that the Iraqi Parliament amended or failed
to
pass the
law, or that it was not ratified by 1 January 2009. However,
Mr Hutton wrote
that:
“… the
Iraqi Council of Ministers voted today to agree the legal text and
have
passed it
to the Council of Representatives … The draft law is expected to
have its
first
reading on 17 December. There is still a chance therefore, if there
are no further
delays,
that it will pass its third Reading on 22 December and be ratified
by the
Presidency
Council no later than 10 days afterwards.”
294.
Mr Brown
spoke by telephone to President Bush on 16
December.111
He
explained
that the UK
had almost agreed the legal arrangements for a continued UK
military
presence in
Iraq in 2009 and that he was grateful for US support.
295.
At its 17
December meeting, the JIC assessed the performance of the
Iraqi
296.
The JIC
assessed that:
“I. Major
security decisions are driven by Prime Minister Maliki … But
his
circumvention
of over-bureaucratic processes has furthered rather than
hampered
the overall
improvement in security.”
297.
The JIC judged
that the ISF would be “much better placed to manage
internal
security in
2009, including during elections, but will be unable wholly to
prevent
111
Letter
Fletcher to Gould, 16 December 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s call with US
President, 16 December’.
112
JIC
Assessment, 18 December 2008, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: Mixed
Abilities’.
429