The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
278.
On 31 August,
Mr Browne’s Private Secretary provided No.10 with an
update
on the
security situation in Basra and ongoing discussions with
JAM.131
In the
letter,
he recapped
negotiations with JAM1 and actions to date and
explained:
“This
arrangement has to date been very successful. Rocket and mortar
attacks on
Basra Air
Station have effectively ceased and those on Basra Palace much
reduced.
The UK
forces withdrawing from the Permanent Joint Co-ordination Centre
on
27 August
did so almost without incident. And resupply convoys to and from
Basra
Palace have
also proceeded with significantly fewer incidents than would
previously
have been
anticipated. As part of these discussions, we have also
secured
assurances
that the handover of Basra Palace will proceed
smoothly.
“The
cease-fire period is due to expire on 13 September: the next stage
of the
discussions
is aimed at ensuring a smooth continuance of these
arrangements
beyond that
point. It is due to involve the release of 11 internees and a
further
month-long
cease-fire period. We are also working up plans to try and ensure
that
a more
permanent arrangement is put in place.”
279.
Although the
operation had “undoubtedly saved lives”, presentational
risks
remained:
“Some of
those involved in the release process are potentially linked, on
the basis
of
intelligence information, to attacks against UK personnel (although
in no cases
do we have
sufficient evidence to initiate legal proceedings through the Iraqi
justice
system and
indeed many would likely have been released in the near future
through
our
standard procedures for managing our internee population). And we
face risks
of
accusations that we have done deals with terrorists, which may
reinforce some of
the
negative comments emerging from the US in recent weeks alleging
that we are
not in
control of events in South-East Iraq and are seeking an early
exit.”
280.
The update
also recorded media coverage alleging the UK had negotiated
a
cease-fire
with JAM but “these have been inaccurate on the detail and have not
yet been
more widely
followed up”:
“But it
does seem likely that it is a matter of when, not if, the story
will break. We
will
consider whether there is scope to be more proactive in media
handling of this
process in
the aftermath of the reports to Congress by Petraeus and Crocker.
In the
meantime we
do not intend to comment on any negotiations that we may have
held
with JAM or
other militia groups.”
281.
On 31 August,
an article by Mr Miliband and Mr Browne entitled ‘Still
on Track in
Basra’
appeared in the Washington
Post.132
In it they
sought to “set the record straight”
following
criticism of the UK’s role in southern Iraq. Although challenges in
Basra
131
Letter
English to Robbins, 31 August 2007, ‘Update on the Security
Situation in Basra and On-going
Discussions
with JAM’.
132
Washington
Post, 31 August
2007, Still on
Track in Basra.
234