The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
resurrect
the option of a land contribution especially should timescales
change. But
it does
mean that the prospect of a significant UK ground role in the North
and our
ability to
influence that part of the US plan is reducing daily
…”
868.
The MOD
advised that preparatory work on Reserves would need to go
forward
soon unless
the US timetable changed. The UK had taken “discreet soundings”
on
whether the
US timetable was realistic:
“The sense
amongst US military planners is that the realistic starting date
for the
current
plan is now slipping. But this does not have political endorsement,
and we
do not know
when or if President Bush will be prepared to signal a later
timetable,
given the
importance of sustaining pressure on Saddam and US domestic
political
considerations.”
869.
The
uncertainty about whether the slippage would be “a matter of days
or
something
more substantial” left two questions to be addressed.
870.
First, in
relation to a land contribution, the MOD stated that Package 3
was:
“… for
practical purposes being excluded by default. If we are to keep the
option
open, and
continue to have the strongest military cards to underpin our
political
influence,
the Defence Secretary believes that we should indicate to the US
that they
should plan
on the assumption that the land contribution would be available,
subject
to final
political approval … This can be done without publicity. It is also
worth noting
that, while
Package 3 is significantly more expensive in itself than
Package 2,
making it
available could significantly reduce our vulnerability to US
requests
to provide
a substantial (and costly) contribution to post‑conflict
stabilisation
operations.”
871.
Second,
Mr Hoon was concerned that he would appear disingenuous if he
failed
on 4
November to answer oral questions about the Reserves, were an
announcement
then to be
made shortly thereafter.
872.
Mr Watkins
concluded that Mr Hoon recognised:
“… that
these issues … cannot be disentangled easily from the political
climate and
the fate of
the UNSCR negotiations which are currently in the balance. But,
equally,
he is
concerned that we should continue to contribute to maintaining the
pressure on
the Iraqis
which has so far shown some level of success.”
873.
Copies of the
letter were sent to the Private Offices of Mr Straw and
Mr Brown, and
to
Mr Bowen.
308