6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
188.
The Embassy
also reported that US planning on longer-term external
financing
had made
little progress.94
The US
recognised the difficult external financial challenges
that were
facing Iraq in the longer term and agreed to the early informal
involvement of
international
financial institutions (IFIs). It favoured rescheduling rather than
forgiveness
of Iraq’s
Paris Club debt and inclined towards extending rather than
cancelling
compensation
payments for damage caused by the 1991 invasion of
Kuwait.
189.
The UK
delegation stressed that early progress was important. Donors
needed
some
certainty about Iraqi liabilities before they would be prepared to
commit substantial
new
resources.
190.
The FCO member
of the UK delegation, the Economic Adviser for the Middle
East
and North
Africa, reported separately to Mr Drummond that the UK
participants had
stressed
that a substantial UN role in the transitional post-conflict
administration was
“not only
politically important but crucial to hopes of effective financial
burden-sharing
and key to
the early attraction of investment in the oil
sector”.95
He
added:
“DoD are
ploughing ahead with detailed contingency planning for the oil
sector in
the initial
military administration phase. But – apart from USAID preparations
on the
humanitarian
side – there was a conspicuous disconnect between this and
civilian
planning
for economic management and policy development within Iraq
…”
191.
The FCO
delegate reported that it had also been agreed that the UK and US
would
approach
the IMF and IBRD separately to make clear there was a major role
for both
organisations
and to encourage them to step up their analysis and contingency
planning.
192.
The House
of Commons debated humanitarian contingency planning
on
30 January.
193.
Ms Short
explained that:
•
The
international community needed to agree that the UN should lead
on
post‑conflict
reconstruction.
•
Preparations
by UN humanitarian agencies were as good as could
be
expected, but the international humanitarian system was
“under
considerable
strain”.
•
DFID would
play its part in the humanitarian system, but its own
resources
were
limited.
94
Telegram
170 Washington to FCO London, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting of
Trilateral Working Group
on “Day
After” Economic Issues: External Finance Issues’.
95
Teleletter
FCO [junior official] to Drummond, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting
of US/UK/Australian
Working
Group on “Day After” Economic Issues: Assessment and Follow
Up’.
343