The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
If “Saddam
co-operated, war could even now be averted”, but Mr Blair
now
“did not
think” that Saddam Hussein would co-operate.
•
He was
“prepared to sign up to a statement that war was avoidable
if
Saddam
co-operated … if Saddam really co-operated he could have
more
time to
complete disarmament. But the Security Council had to be the
judge
of co‑operation”.
•
He “needed
to know whether he had Chilean and Mexican
support”.334
1066.
Mr Rycroft
reported that President Lagos was opposed to a short deadline
and
had decided
to wait to see what happened at the Security Council the following
day.
1067.
An
assessment of Iraq’s intentions on 6 March concluded that the
strategy
was to play
for time, and Iraq thought that strategy was working.
1068.
The
Assessments Staff was confident that Saddam Hussein’s aim
would
be the
eventual re-creation of his WMD capability.
1069.
Mr Miller
provided an assessment of ‘Saddam’s possible next moves’
for
Sir David
Manning on 6 March.335
The
document was also sent to officials in the
FCO, the
MOD and the Cabinet Office.
1070.
Mr Miller
described Saddam Hussein’s strategy as “to play for time,
gradually
releasing
limited information on Iraq’s terms or when there is no other
option”.
Iraq thought
its strategy was working. Mr Miller stated: “Even if he
[Saddam Hussein]
does opt
for a declaration of WMD, we are confident that his aim would be
the
eventual re-creation
of his capability.”
1071.
Mr Miller
advised that the decision to destroy the Al Samoud 2 missiles
was
“indicative
of Saddam’s strategy: a drawn out debate with UNMOVIC over
legality; an
offer to
form a ‘technical committee’ to review the weapon; compliance; and
an attempt
to portray
compliance as a major concession”. Mr Miller predicted that
Iraq would “draw
out the
destruction process”, which might take “as long as two months to
complete”.
1072.
Other points
made by Mr Miller included:
•
Iraq was
“likely to follow a pattern of a drip feed of information to
UNMOVIC”.
•
Passing
over documents only in Arabic might be a deliberate tactic
to
delay verification.
•
It could
take two to three weeks to validate any documentation to back up
Iraq’s
claims to
have destroyed VX.
334
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation
with President of Chile,
6 March’.
335
Minute
Miller to Manning, 6 March 2003, Iraq: Potential Compliance with
UNMOVIC’.
370