The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
366.
The UK
Government was right to think very carefully about both of those
points.
367.
First, the
close strategic alliance with the US has been a cornerstone of the
UK’s
foreign and
security policy under successive governments since the Second World
War.
Mr Blair
rightly attached great importance to preserving and strengthening
it.
368.
After the
attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, that relationship was
reinforced
when
Mr Blair declared that the UK would stand “shoulder to
shoulder” with the US to
defeat and
eradicate international terrorism.173
The action
that followed in Afghanistan
to bring
about the fall of the Taliban served to strengthen and deepen the
sense of
shared
endeavour.
369.
When the US
Administration turned its attention to regime change in Iraq as
part
of the
second phase of the “Global War on Terror”, Mr Blair’s
immediate response was
to seek to
offer a partnership and to work with it to build international
support for the
position
that Iraq was a threat which had to be dealt with.
370.
In
Mr Blair’s view, the decision to stand alongside the US was in
the UK’s long‑term
national
interests. In his speech of 18 March 2003, he argued that the
handling of Iraq
would:
“...
determine the way in which Britain and the world confront the
central security
threat of
the 21st century, the development of the United Nations, the
relationship
between
Europe and the United States, the relations within the European
Union and
the way in
which the United States engages with the rest of the world. So it
could
hardly be
more important. It will determine the pattern of international
politics for
the next
generation.”
371.
In his memoir
in 2010, Mr Blair wrote:
“I knew in
the final analysis I would be with the US, because it was right
morally
and
strategically. But we should make a last ditch attempt for a
peaceful solution.
First to
make the moral case for removing Saddam ... Second, to try one more
time
to reunite
the international community behind a clear base for action in the
event of
372.
Concern about
the consequences, were the UK not to give full support to
the
US, featured
prominently in policy calculations across Whitehall. Mr Hoon,
for example,
sought
advice from Sir Kevin Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary,
on the
implications
for the alliance of the UK’s approach to Iraq.175
373.
Although there
has historically been a very close relationship between the
British
and
American peoples and a close identity of values between our
democracies, it is an
173
The
National Archives, 11 September 2001, September
11 attacks: Prime Minister’s statement.
174
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
175
Minute
Tebbit to Secretary of State [MOD], 14 January 2003, ‘Iraq: What
If?’.
52