4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
712.
The JIC
Assessment of 10 May 2001 stated:
•
Intelligence
reports reflected “a
continuing chemical warfare programme,
including
research and development, together with the possible production
and
weaponisation
of agent”.
•
The JIC had
“good intelligence of Iraq’s former chemical and biological
warfare
(CBW)
facilities, their limited reconstruction and civil
production”.
•
The JIC had
“good intelligence of Iraq’s former CW associated
facilities”.
•
Intelligence
of “other related CW activity, including possible weaponisation”
was
“less
clear”.
•
“Whilst the
picture as regards biological weapons was unclear,” there
were
indications
of “continuing biological warfare research and the
possible
713.
The
introduction to the CIG Assessment of 15 March 2002
stated:
“Intelligence
on Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic
missile
programmes
is sporadic
and patchy. Iraq is
also well practised in the art of
concealment
and exaggeration. A complete picture of various programmes
is
therefore
difficult. But it is clear that Iraq continues to pursue a policy
of acquiring
WMD and
their delivery means. Intelligence indicates that planning to
reconstitute
some of its
programmes began in 1995. WMD programmes were then given
a
further
boost in 1998 with the withdrawal of UNSCOM
inspectors.”390
714.
On detailed
points, the Assessment stated:
•
“We
continue to judge that Iraq has an offensive chemical
warfare (CW)
programme,
although there is very little intelligence relating to
it.”
•
“From the
evidence available … we believe Iraq retains some
production
equipment,
and some small stocks of CW agent precursors, and may
have hidden
small quantities of agents and weapons. Anomalies
in Iraqi
declarations
to UNSCOM suggest stocks
could be much larger.”
•
Intelligence
on production facilities was “scarce” and “the reconstructed
former
precursor
facility near Habbaniyah” was “insufficient to support large-scale
CW
agent
production”.
•
“Other
industrial chemical facilities could be used … but we have no
intelligence
to suggest
they are currently being used in that role.”
•
“Intelligence
has indicated an Iraqi interest in transportable production
facilities
for
chemical weapons, but these could produce only small amounts of
agent and
we judge it
more likely that the mobile units are filling
munitions”.
389
JIC
Assessment, 10 May 2001, ‘Iraqi WMD Programmes: Status and
Vulnerability’.
390
CIG
Assessment, 15 March 2002, ‘The Status of Iraqi WMD
Programmes’.
251