9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
900.
The accounts
were to cover:
“1.
Sunni
outreach.
2.
Shia
religious and political leaders, and their attitude.
3.
Other
political players, including candidates for Prime Minister,
Presidency,
Cabinet.
4.
Area-by-area
analysis on security.
5.
Report by
GOC MND(SE).
6.
Police and
civil defence training and readiness.
7.
Security
arrangements from 1/7, including UN role.
8.
Media.
9.
Reconstruction,
spending and disbursement.
10.
Attitudes
of the neighbouring countries.
11.
Everyday
life report.
12.
Judicial
system.
13.
Women’s
groups.
14.
Schools,
universities, hospitals.
15.
Check
list of further action.”
901.
During the
meeting of the Iraq Senior Officials Group on 20 April, it was
made
clear that
Mr Blair considered that progress needed to be accelerated in
all areas of
reconstruction
in order to make transition a success.498
He had
therefore “decided to
follow
developments more closely himself”, which had led to Sir Nigel’s
commission. It
was
explained that:
“IraqRep
should prepare a weekly checklist of immediate actions. The Cabinet
Office
would
ensure that interested departments in London would be consulted on
the
list before
it, together with the reports, were [sic] submitted in the Prime
Minister’s
Friday box.
The Prime Minister would use it in his weekly discussions with
Bush.”
902.
Of the reports
commissioned by Sir Nigel, most were requested on a weekly
or
fortnightly
basis. Those on neighbouring countries, the judicial system,
women’s groups
and schools
were to be monthly.
903.
When
Mr Blair and Mr Richmond met on 21 April, Mr Blair
highlighted that the final
point on
the list – “points for him to raise with Bush each week” – was
crucial.499
Mr Blair
suggested
it was important for Ambassador Bremer to make “a major speech”
setting
out CPA
policy as soon as possible.
498
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Buck, 23 April 2004, ‘Iraq:
Senior Officials Group’.
499
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 21 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s meeting
with David Richmond’.
353