3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
416.
Cabinet was
not informed of the strategy Mr Blair had agreed with
President
Bush to
manage the issue until 17 March.
417.
There was
no discussion of the options available to the UK if the attempt
to
secure a
second resolution failed.
418.
Mr Gordon
Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Ms Short,
whose
responsibilities
were directly engaged, had not seen Lord Goldsmith’s
legal
advice of 7
March.
419.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 13 March that work continued in the UN to obtain a
second
resolution.126
The UK had
presented proposals for six “tests”, “endorsed by
Dr Blix”,
to judge
whether Saddam Hussein had decided to commit himself to
disarmament.
Satisfying
those tests would not mean that disarmament was complete, but that
the
first steps
had been taken. The non-permanent members of the Security
Council
were
uncomfortable with a situation where “following the French decision
to veto”, the
Permanent
Members were “not shouldering their responsibilities properly”. The
“outcome
in the
Security Council remained open”. If the United Nations process
broke down,
difficult
decisions would be required and there would be another Cabinet
meeting at
which the
Attorney General would be present.
420.
Mr Blair
also stated that the MEPP needed to be “revived”; and that
“the
reconstruction
of Iraq after a conflict would need a United Nations Security
Council
resolution”.
The US had “now agreed” to that, which would “help to bring
countries with
divergent
views on military action back together again”.
421.
Mr Straw
said that although there were differences between members of
the
Security
Council, “none was saying that Iraq was complying with its
international
obligations”;
and that it “followed that Iraq continued to be in material breach”
of
those obligations.
422.
On the legal
basis for military action, Mr Straw said that he “was already
on
record
setting out the position to the Foreign Affairs Committee” on 4
March. Mr Straw
rehearsed
the negotiating history of resolution 1441 (2002), stating
that:
•
“the French
and Russians had wanted a definition of what would
constitute
a material
breach, but had settled for the facts being presented to
the
Security Council”;
•
“they had
also wanted a statement that explicit authorisation was required
for
military
action and instead had settled for further consideration by the
Security
Council …”;
and
•
failure by
Iraq to comply with resolution 1441 “revived the
authorisations
existing”
in resolutions 678 (1990) and 687 (1991).
126
Cabinet
Conclusions, 13 March 2003.
473