9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
climate. He
would raise again with President Bush UK concerns about the
SOFA,
including
“the real risk we would run out of time”.
204.
On 18
September, at the request of the MOD and PJHQ, the JIC circulated
its
Assessment
of the prospects for security across southern Iraq into
2009.74
205.
The JIC judged
that overall security had improved significantly since the Charge
of
the Knights
operation against JAM in March. The authority of the Iraqi
Government now
extended
into previously “no-go” areas. There were reports of improved
perceptions of
general
security among Basrawis, and instances of violent criminality and
score-settling
were
reported to have fallen. There had only been three attacks on the
MNF at Basra Air
Base in the
previous six weeks.
206.
The JIC
assessed that security gains in Maysan had been more limited in
scope
and
restricted to al-Amara. Security in Muthanna and Dhi Qar provinces
remained
“less of
a challenge for local security forces”.
207.
The JIC had
recently assessed that JAM was “in greater disarray and weaker
than
at any time
since 2003”, but a threat remained:
“II. …
Whether Sadr’s planned small armed wing resumes attacks on
Multi-National
Forces
(MNF) is likely to depend on whether the coalition agrees a
timetable for
withdrawal
… A few other hard-liners will continue such attacks in any case.
In the
longer
term, violent criminality, murders, kidnappings, score-settling and
intimidation
may
gradually increase again.
“III. The
Iranian-backed Special Groups … are likely to be better trained
and
equipped
and focused on attacking US forces as they return from Iran. They
and
a number of
smaller Shia militias will probably also see attacks on withdrawing
UK
forces as
an opportunity to claim victory over the coalition (albeit that US
forces will
take their
place). But anti-MNF attacks are unlikely to reach anywhere near
the peak
seen in
2007.”
208.
Looking to the
future, JIC continued:
“IV.
Locally raised army units in the South will continue to need
coalition mentors
and to
operate alongside more experienced Iraqi forces to manage security
for the
rest of
this year. By early 2009, provided JAM remains quiescent, they will
be able
to cope
with only limited MNF mentoring. Intra-Shia clashes are likely to
intensify
as provincial
elections approach …
“V. Further
growth in the local economy is probable in 2009. But
significant
economic
improvement depends on security, sustained political support and a
major
improvement
in government ability to implement reconstruction and
development
projects.
All are likely to remain uncertain for some years …”
74
JIC
Assessment, 18 September 2008, ‘Iraq: Security in the
South’.
415