The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1334.
In his letter
of 3 January about the announcement of the ATG deployment
on
7 January,
Mr Watkins alerted Sir David Manning to the need to
reconsider options
for the
UK’s ground contribution because of doubts about transit through
Turkey.506
He advised:
“It may …
be necessary to take decisions next week to give us time to
train
additional
units for Operation FRESCO … freeing up units that, under new
plans,
might
deploy to the South.
“In the
meantime, we are continuing with preparations to enable a ground
force
contribution
of at least an armoured brigade (and its Divisional HQ) to deploy
as
soon as
possible.”
1335.
In his minute
of 3 January on the way ahead on Iraq over the next few
weeks,
which is
addressed in Section 3.6, Mr Straw informed Mr Blair that
Turkey would not
allow US or
UK troops through on the ground and that was “leading CENTCOM
to
re‑think”;
and that “must have an impact on the robustness of the overall
plan, and
1336.
Mr Straw’s
minute was not sent to Mr Hoon.
1337.
On 3 January,
Sir David Manning and Dr Rice discussed the possibility
of a
military
attack without the northern option.508
In the
light of the previous advice about
its importance,
Sir David said that he was “uneasy”.
1338.
In an update
on Iraq for Mr Blair on 3 January, which is also addressed
in
Section
3.6, Sir David Manning wrote that he was worried that US
strategy was in
danger of
being driven by the tempo of military planning which assumed
decisions
in
mid‑February.509
A “long
hard look at the current state of the military planning”
was
needed:
“Too much looks like hurried improvisation, half thought out
strategy”, which
assumed
that Saddam Hussein would collapse “in short order”.
1339.
After
Mr Hoon’s visit to Ankara on 7 and 8 January 2003, the UK
formally
ruled out
the northern option.
1340.
Mr Hoon,
Sir Kevin Tebbit, Lt Gen Pigott and Mr Lee
visited Turkey on
7 to
8 January to “discuss a range of topics, including
Iraq”.510
1341.
Mr Hoon
told Secretary Rumsfeld on 7 January that he would emphasise
the
importance
of the northern approach for a successful military campaign during
his visit
506
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 3 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Update on Military
Planning and Draft Statement’.
507
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 3 January 2003, ‘Iraq – Plan
B’.
508
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 3 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi
Rice’.
509
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 3 January 2003, ‘Iraq’.
510
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 7 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Rumsfeld’.
372