14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
Within the
DPA and the DLO were a number of Integrated
Project Teams (IPTs) focused
on
delivering individual projects and programmes as directed by the
DECs. The IPT was
responsible
for the equipment throughout its life.
The DPA and
the DLO merged to form the Defence
Equipment and Support Agency
(DE&S)
in April
2007.7
The Head of
the DE&S was the Chief of
Defence Materiel.
16.
A process
diagram attached to the November 2004 Standing Instruction
indicated
that PJHQ
had the lead responsibility for identification of a requirement,
working with
the
Directorate of Equipment Capability (DEC), the FLCs and the
relevant Integrated
Project
Team (IPT) in the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) or Defence
Logistics
Organisation
(DLO).
17.
The
instruction included an annex with a list of “UOR key stakeholders”
and their
roles and
responsibilities.
18.
The list began
with the responsibilities of “Force Elements”: the deployed
units
reporting
to the in‑theatre commander, which was the General Officer
Commanding
Multi‑National
Division (South‑East) (GOC MND(SE)) during Op TELIC. The
annex
said that
the Force Elements were responsible for raising SORs, along with
any training
and
integration.
19.
The role and
responsibilities of FLCs included:
•
“Conducts
routine audits to identify potential USURs as part of the
Equipment
Capability
Shortfall Register.”
•
“USUR
originator.”
20.
The role and
responsibilities of PJHQ included:
•
“Reviews/endorses
USURs and submits to DEC.”
•
“Agrees
solutions to capability gaps proposed by DECs.”
21.
In response to
a request from the Inquiry in 2011, the MOD provided
further
evidence on
how the UOR process functioned in Iraq.8
The MOD
stated:
•
“The
fundamental elements of the UOR process remained broadly the
same
throughout
operations in Iraq.”
•
Staff
deployed in Iraq, and (in the build‑up to the operation) staff in
FLCs, were
responsible
for identifying capability gaps “which could not be met by
existing
holdings”.
7
Report
Gray, October 2009, ‘Review of Acquisition for the Secretary of
State for Defence’.
8
Paper
[MOD], 8 June 2011, ‘How the UOR Process Functioned During the
Campaign in Iraq’.
7