The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Type
Features
A
B
(the
Expeditionary
or “Rest of
World”
vehicle)
C
Essentially
a Snatch replacement with the
same levels
of ballistic protection for low level
counter‑terror
and public order operations, mainly
for use in
Northern Ireland.
For
expeditionary use in “high threat CT
operations”.
The minimum ballistic protection
level
required was considered to be B6 (as was
currently
provided by Tavern).
A
specialised EOD vehicle; again requiring B6
ballistic
protection for use on expeditionary
operations.
Estimated
number
required
612
144
120
256.
On protection
levels, the DEC(SP) said that “the terrorist will invariably
overmatch
the target”
given that Iraqi and other Middle Eastern terrorists had been “able
to destroy
tanks in
IED attacks”:
“Protection
levels therefore should be optimised for blast, fragments, the
‘near‑miss’
etc rather
than to defeat direct attack. Protection for a PPV is more a
function of
Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) (examples include top‑cover
sentries,
combined
foot and mounted patrols, multiple vehicle patrols, helicopter
top‑cover
etc) than
thickness of armour.”
257.
The purchase
of new vehicles to meet the Type A requirement had an
estimated
total
programme cost of £62.5m. As only £55.31m of funding was available,
an upgrade
to Snatch
2, at an estimated total cost of £53.8m, was
recommended.
258.
DEC(SP)
intended to take a “twin‑track” approach to
procurement:
•
A programme
to upgrade existing Snatch vehicles to Snatch 2 would
begin
almost
immediately to meet the Type A requirement, with 100 Snatch 2
being
available
by 31 December 2004 and a further 200 by 30 June 2005.
•
An initial
assessment for the remainder of the Type A requirement and the
Types
B and C
requirement would be undertaken. Delivery of the Type B
requirement
was
expected in Financial Year (FY) 2006/07 and Type C was expected
in
FY 2007/08.
259.
The letter
identified the savings measure imposed from the 2004 Spending
Review,
to reduce
the expeditionary capability from medium to small scale in the
longer term,
as
“programme blight”. It stated that that, and “the lack of an
endorsed requirement for
both
numbers and capability”, meant that a business case for the whole
light protected
mobility
requirement would not be available before September
2004.
46