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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
926.  The Cabinet Office also supplied a check list of points for Mr Blair, which raised the
urgent need to agree what would replace the CPA outside Baghdad after transition, work
on which had “scarcely started”.513
927.  The Cabinet Office list went on to record the need for “genuine partnership”
between the MNF and Iraqi forces “including at high command level, if we are to raise
the performance of Iraqi security forces and tackle insurgents and terrorists”.
928.  The IPU supplied a paper on Iraq’s neighbours, which proposed that:
“Developing regional support for the political process is essential to build the
legitimacy of the new Iraqi political institutions and assist the reconstruction
process.”514
929.  The paper divided neighbouring states into three groups: constructive, cautious
and difficult. IPU’s conclusion was that:
“We should continue to engage all the neighbours on a bilateral basis,
co-ordinating our efforts with the US, and discreetly encourage development
of the neighbours group.”
930.  Mr Chris Segar, Head of the British Office Baghdad, sent a paper on everyday
life in Baghdad, written in the voice of an Iraqi named ‘Mohammed’.515 Mr Segar
summarised Mohammed’s concerns as:
“When will I be able to go about my life without fearing for my safety and that of
my family? I have more faith in the Dinar these days; but I don’t have enough of
them. Some other things are better now too. But I’m not sure what is going on in
the Green Zone; and I don’t think there is anyone who represents me. Al Jazeera
and Al Arabiyya – and more people on the street – tell me that the occupiers have
no respect for my people. I’m glad that Saddam is gone; but will my children have a
better life here?”
931.  On security, Mr Blair received a telegram from Mr Asquith describing the situation
area by area, and a minute from Maj Gen Stewart in MND(SE).
932.  Mr Asquith wrote that:
“Fallujah and Najaf continue to hang heavy over any security forecast. If the storm
breaks there, the effects will spread widely.
“The overall security threat is high. There are regular attacks against Coalition
Forces (CF), Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and infrastructure targets across the
513  Paper Cabinet Office, 23 April 2004, ‘Non Fallujah Points for the PM’.
514  Paper IPU, 22 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Role of Neighbours’.
515  Telegram 034 Baghdad to FCO London, 22 April 2004, ‘My Name is Mohammed (or a Life in
Baghdad)’.
358
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