9.6 | 27 June 2007 to April 2008

envisaged a process for Basra PIC beginning in late October, with an announcement

in November. Mr McDonald said that officials would need to lobby the US about the

timetable in advance of the statement.

363. In advance of Gen Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker’s visit to London,

Mr Prentice sent some “thoughts” to the FCO on what the issues at stake were in Iraq,

what was expected of the UK by the US and Iraqi governments and what roles the UK

could and should continue to perform in order to meet or manage those expectations.184

The advice had been discussed with Lt Gen Rollo, who was reported to be “in broad

agreement”.

364. Mr Prentice’s summary assessment was that the best means to win agreement to

PIC in Basra in November would be a “UK re-commitment now to a convincing range of

longer-term tasks, including in the South”. One of his first impressions was that:

“Uncertainty and therefore anxiety over UK long-term intentions is widespread,

among both senior Iraqis and senior US contacts. And public perceptions, fed by the

media, continue to misinterpret our strategy for Basra province.”

365. Mr Prentice wrote that Iraq was important to UK interests both for reputational

reasons and because Iraq’s future was still in the balance; the risk of it descending into

chaos and division, rather having a powerful positive influence in the region, was one

that needed to be tackled:

“Whether they were at the beginning or not, our global CT [counter-terrorism]

interests are certainly now closely engaged in the Iraq theatre.”

366. Mr Prentice acknowledged that the UK’s strategy in southern Iraq had been fully

discussed and agreed by both the US and the Iraqi Government and that no decisions

had yet been taken on medium- and long-term engagement, but also that public

interpretation remained that “we are set on full military withdrawal in the shortest order

possible”. Although he and Lt Gen Rollo and their predecessors had sought to reassure

the US that that was not so, “their confidence in us is becoming more fragile. The

reputational risks in this for the UK are clear.”

367. Mr Prentice said that US concerns were understood to centre on:

• whether the UK would maintain a Divisional Command in MND(SE);

• continuity for the Basra PRT;

• protection for the US Regional Embassy Office, which had just relocated from

Basra Palace to the COB in order to fit in with UK strategy;

• continuing specialist military support for the ISF;

• continued training and mentoring of the ISF;

184 eGram 37677/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 13 September 2007, ‘Iraq: Future UK Posture:

What is at Stake’.

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