6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
221.
Lt Gen Dutton
told the Inquiry:
“… we were
all interested to know whether there was any planning going on
for
other
potential operations. I used to ask that question of the J‑3,
General Newbold
… and he
would be quite honest in saying that they were doing staff checks
for any
number of
contingencies and, if asked specifically about Iraq, he would not
deny that
they were
looking at what they could do, if asked …”113
222.
Lt Gen Pigott
sent Mr Hoon an update on the work of the SPG on 10
May.114
223.
Lt Gen Pigott
stated:
“Any
thinking we do about joining the US in military operations against
the Iraqi
regime
needs to be informed by our thinking in two key areas: the impact
of potential
courses of
action open to a coalition and the capability the UK might
contribute to
such a
coalition.”
224.
The SPG had
concluded that the US had decided to pursue regime change;
the
question
was when, including whether to pursue weapons inspections before a
military
build‑up.
The MOD’s “best guess” was that the recommendation would be for
action at
“the turn
of the year” but it did not expect to be “exposed” to US planning
until advice
had been
put to President Bush, probably in late May. The UK would “need to
be ready
to discuss
Iraq with the Americans as soon as they share planning with
us”.
225.
Work had been
commissioned on the capabilities the UK might aim to
provide
within
periods of three to four and six to eight months; setting out the
key decision and
deployment
points.
226.
Lt Gen Pigott
suggested that this could lead to “a note to the Prime
Minister
setting out
these and the financial implications of taking contingency action
now”. The
advantage
of characterising this work as “contingency planning and
considering generic
force
packages” was that it offered “the possibility of wider debate and
scrutiny in the
department
than would be available if we were to consider specific courses of
action, for
operational
security reasons”. The work needed to be supported by “thinking on
what
‘end state’
HMG is seeking to achieve and about the legal basis on which action
would
be taken
forward”.
227.
Mr Hoon
noted Lt Gen Pigott’s advice and asked for a meeting to
discuss the work
and when it
would be appropriate to convene a meeting with Mr Blair and
Mr Straw.115
228.
In a letter
the same day as Lt Gen Pigott’s update on wider issues,
which is
addressed
in Section 3.3, Mr Webb told Mr Ricketts:
113
Public
hearing, 12 July 2010, pages 2‑3.
114
Minute
DCDS(C) to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 10 May 2002,
‘Iraq’.
115
Minute
Williams to DCDS(C), 13 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.
209