The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
322.
Gen Dannatt
recorded his impression that “at a low level the force levels
in
Baghdad are
beginning to tip the balance”. He reported Lt Gen Odierno’s
estimate that
65 percent
of Bagdad was “firmly under control”.
323.
On Basra, Gen
Dannatt found that:
“… our own
tactical thinking was beginning to reflect that in Baghdad … we had
far
more in
common than differences despite the best efforts of some of the US
staff to
confuse the
situation.”
324.
Gen Dannatt
described Basra as “tentatively quiet” but observed that
security
would only
be sustainable “if we now begin to deliver some results on the
ground in
terms of
reconstruction and development”. He cautioned:
“We
probably now have a very narrow window of opportunity to reinforce
the
success
that has been achieved on the ground, but we must not become the
victims
of that
success by believing that because it is quiet that we have done all
we can –
the
emphasis must now shift away from the military line of operation …
Perhaps it is
even time
to consider whether we should be pushing the FCO or DFID into a
more
leading
role?”
325.
In relation to
the UK’s ability to re-intervene in Basra, Gen Dannatt
wrote:
“I sense
that there is the potential for great confusion about what we
actually
mean by
this widely used term. I believe that it is unrealistic to think
that we could
re‑intervene
in Basra without considerable cost, indeed to do so would be a
massive
retrograde
step in campaign terms. The focus should be perhaps to enable
ISF
re‑intervention
in the city with the coalition enabling this task.”
326.
If the ISF
were unable to re-intervene successfully, the Corps Reserve
brigade
might be
called on. The UK’s “residual focus for a time-limited period”
would be on
capacity-building
with the ISF and in the Basra economy. If that was to be the
case,
Gen Dannatt
saw the UK deployment as between 1,000 and 1,500
troops.
327.
Gen Dannatt
concluded his report:
“In
summary, I found a campaign that is at a major crossroads and
facing a narrow
window of
opportunity. The opportunities are time sensitive – we must be seen
to be
reducing
our forces, we must be prepared to engage with all parties and we
must
follow up
military operations with effective political and economic
development.
We must
base our thinking on the fact that we only have a limited amount of
time
to change
tack before … we out stay our welcome once more … I am
conscious
that we
have not yet received any political direction, but from an Army
viewpoint I
can see a
definite way forward on the ground in Iraq, consistent with any
plans for
greater
investment in Afghanistan and in a modest return to
contingency.”
244