4.4 | The
search for WMD
32.
The UK
Military Campaign Objectives, published on 20 March, stated
that the main
tasks of
the Coalition included:
•
denying the
Iraqi regime the use of weapons of mass destruction now and
in
the future;
•
removing
the Iraqi regime, given its clear and unyielding refusal to comply
with
the UN
Security Council’s demands; and
•
identifying
and securing the sites where weapons of mass destruction and
their
means of
delivery were located.15
33.
The list of
“immediate military priorities” in the wake of hostilities included
“work with
UNMOVIC and
the IAEA to rid Iraq of its WMD”.
34.
On
17 March, Mr John Scarlett, Chairman of the Joint
Intelligence Committee (JIC),
sent Sir
David Manning, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser and Head of
the Cabinet Office
Overseas
and Defence Secretariat (OD Sec), a minute addressing the different
elements
of Iraq’s
capability, including Iraq’s actions since the departure of the
inspectors in 1998
to pursue
chemical and biological weapons programmes, and Iraq’s activities
to pursue
enhanced
ballistic missile and other means to deliver them.16
35.
In a Note
produced on 19 March, the JIC continued to assess that Iraq
had usable
chemical
and biological weapons and the intent to use them.17
36.
The UK
assessments of Iraq’s WMD capabilities and intent and their
evolution
between
2000 and March 2003 are addressed in detail in Sections 4.1, 4.2
and 4.3.
37.
In a
discussion with President Bush on 24 March, Mr Blair
underlined the
importance
of Coalition Forces finding Saddam’s WMD.18
38.
At the end
of March, Mr Scarlett set out for No.10 the Assessments Staff
view
of what the
Coalition might find in Iraq, including that:
•
the bulk of
the sites that might yield results were located in the
Baghdad
area;
and
•
most had
been “cleansed over the preceding six to nine months”.
39.
Mr Scarlett
set out the views of the Assessments Staff on what “WMD”
the
Coalition “should
expect to discover, when and how”, in a minute to Sir David
Manning
15
Iraq:
Military Campaign Objectives, 18 March 2003.
16
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 17 March 2003, ‘Iraqi WMD: Evidence of
Possession’.
17
Note JIC,
19 March 2003, ‘Saddam: The Beginning of the
End’.
18
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 24 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
telephone conversation with
President
Bush, 24 February [sic]’.
19
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 31 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Update on
WMD’.
431