6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
•
the danger
that Iraqi support would erode rapidly in the absence of
an
acceptable
interim administration and a clear road map to an
Iraqi-led
administration;
and
•
the risk of
creating fertile ground for Al Qaida.
628.
In late
February, the MOD established a small “Red Team” within the DIS to
give
key
planners in Whitehall an independent view of intelligence
assumptions and key
judgements,
to challenge if appropriate and to identify areas where more work
was
629.
Papers were
copied to the Chiefs of Staff, PJHQ, the MOD, the FCO, the IPU
and
the JIC.
There is no evidence that they were seen in No.10.
Between
February and April 2003 the DIS Red Team produced five reports on
post-conflict
issues:
•
‘Regional
Responses to Conflict in Iraq and the Aftermath’;
•
‘Obtaining and
Retaining the Support of the Iraqi People in the Aftermath
of
Conflict’;
•
‘What Will
Happen in Baghdad?’;
•
‘The Future
Governance of Iraq’;
•
‘The Strands
of the Rope’ (an assessment of the steps needed to
achieve
an
effective Iraqi Interim Administration and hand over to a
representative
government
of Iraq).
The first
two reports are addressed in this Section. The other three were
issued in April,
after the
start of the invasion, and are described in Section
10.1.
Four of the
five reports were described as drawing on “a variety of sources
inside the
Allied
intelligence community and … a panel of regional experts assembled
… by
Kings
College, London”.274
Professor
Sir Lawrence Freedman was listed as one of the
contributors
to the first paper.
The fifth
report, on Baghdad, “sought the perspectives of academic sources
and members
of the
Iraqi exile community in UK (military and civilian) to gain fresh
insights, and to a
certain
extent reflects their views”.275
All five
reports were copied widely within the MOD, to PJHQ (Lt Gen Reith),
the JIC
(Mr Scarlett)
and to the FCO/IPU (Mr Ehrman and Mr Chilcott). The last
three were also
addressed
to the MOD/DIS US Liaison Officer. It is not clear how they were
used.
273
Minute
PS/CDI to APS2/SofS [MOD], 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Red Teaming in
the DIS’.
274
Minute
PS/CDI to APS2/SofS [MOD], 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq Red Team –
Regional responses to
conflict in
Iraq and the Aftermath’ attaching Paper, DIS Red Team, ‘Regional
Responses to Conflict in Iraq
and the
Aftermath’.
275
Minute
PS/CDI to various, 7 April 2003, ‘Iraq Red Team – What Will Happen
in Baghdad?’
421