The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
by letting
the inspectors back in, that there might, after all, be a route to
resolving
this
problem through the inspection route and without military
action.”321
918.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Mr Pattison offered his perspective
“on how FCO
policy
officials understood” resolution 1441 “at the time of its
drafting”.322
919.
Mr Pattison
wrote that the “objectives in negotiating the text were clear by
early
September
2002”. The FCO wanted “if possible to secure a resolution
which:
(i) brought
the UN back into the process by putting the focus on the
disarmament
process
(rather than follow the perceived US agenda of regime
change);
(ii) made
clear that Iraq had an absolutely final opportunity to comply with
UN
demands;
and
(iii)
contained authorisation to use force if necessary.”
920.
Mr Pattison’s
“broad understanding during the negotiations was that, at
a
minimum,
the position of previous Attorneys General required us to obtain a
resolution
which
contained a material breach finding and talked of ‘serious
consequences’ if Iraq
remained in
breach”.
921.
Mr Pattison
explained:
“At the
risk of stating the obvious, I think it worth pointing out that
Security Council
resolutions
are often the products of complex political negotiations. The
result is
that the
texts are sometimes more nuanced than one might expect in domestic
law
making …
They are made by states seeking to protect political positions as
well as
to make
international law. They often contain important compromises, which
allow
states with
different points of view to sign up to a final text claiming it
protects their
positions
while knowing it gives another group of states what they were
seeking.”323
922.
Mr Pattison
told the Inquiry that the objectives “were all equally important”
as a
means to
achieving the objective of trying to “bring about an Iraq about
whom we had
no questions
concerning their weapons programme”.324
923.
Mr Rycroft
told the Inquiry:
“Our top
objective was to get the Iraq issue back into the UN. By that we
meant a
UN Security
Council resolution ideally by unanimity that sets out a final
opportunity,
an
ultimatum to comply with all the previous resolutions, and a
two‑stage process
so that if
there were further evidence of non‑compliance or
non‑co‑operation,
then … a
discussion but not a further resolution by the Security Council
about
the
consequences. So one objective was to keep the international
community
321
Public
hearing, 1 December 2009, page 26.
322
Statement,
January 2011, paragraphs 1‑2.
323
Statement,
January 2011, paragraph 3.
324
Public
hearing, 31 January 2011, page 11.
364