10.1 | Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

been directed to ORHA(South) by 1(UK) Div and Maj Gen Cross. Those officers

were useful as “stopgaps”, but ORHA(Baghdad) needed to provide expert staff.

• ORHA(Baghdad) was “dysfunctional and totally pre-occupied with Baghdad”.

There had been no attempt to engage with ORHA(South), including on policy

issues. Communication was virtually non-existent (it remained impossible to

telephone anyone in Baghdad).

• Ambassador Olsen was “very unhappy” with the seeming indifference of

ORHA(Baghdad) and the lack of resources. It was not out of the question that

he would leave if things did not improve.

• ORHA(South)’s “concept of operations” was to work jointly with the military

and, once it had built its knowledge base and secured the necessary resources,

to move into the lead allowing the military to focus on security and their

exit strategy. That would not happen until ORHA(South) had considerably

more people.234

413. Her second report provided an assessment of ORHA(South)’s staffing

requirement.235 Additional support was required in 15 areas; in most of those, three or

four specialists would be required to make a discernible difference across the region.

The areas included: electricity; water and sewerage; infrastructure/reconstruction; the

judiciary; human rights; gender issues; the economy (two DFID advisers were due to

arrive in Basra shortly); political analysis; and the media.

414. ORHA(South) itself needed an office manager, a logistics manager, a finance

officer, an information manager and security staff (both for the office and to enable

moves outside Basra).

415. After returning to the UK, Mr Blair sent a personal Note to President Bush.236

Mr Blair wrote:

“I met Jerry Bremer and others in Iraq. He is very impressive, got a real grip and is

doing a great job. But the task is absolutely awesome and I’m not at all sure we’re

geared for it. This is worse than re-building a country from scratch.

“We start from a really backward position. In time, it can be sorted. But time counts

against us …”

416. Mr Blair went on to suggest that:

• Security in Baghdad had to be dealt with at once.

• “Bechtel needs to move far more quickly in letting contracts for infrastructure

reconstruction – patching up won’t do”.

234 Minute UK [junior official] to Chilcott, 1 June 2003, ‘ORHA South – First Impressions’.

235 Minute UK [junior official] to Chilcott, 1 June 2003, ‘Additional Staffing Requirements for ORHA South’.

236 Letter Manning to McDonald, 2 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Note’ attaching Note [Blair to Bush],

[undated], ‘Note’.

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