The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
273.
On 15
November, the JIC judged that:
“The Iraqi
Government’s response to deteriorating security remains
ineffective. Many
Shia
politicians blame all violence on ‘Ba’athists’. There has been no
progress on
national
reconciliation …”217
274.
The Iraq
Forward Plan developed by UK officials in November 2006 (see
Section
9.5) said
that the UK should encourage Iraqi political leaders to sign up to
a Declaration
of
Principles/National Compact which included a commitment to prevent
the return of a
Ba’athist
government “while reviewing de‑Ba’athification to allow all those
who have not
committed
crimes to participate in building Iraqi stability and
prosperity”.218
275.
Implementing
the Compact would require two new bodies: a Peace
Commission
and a
Reconciliation/Rehabilitation Commission. The latter, it was
proposed, would
not deal
with cases before the de‑Ba’athification Commission which would
continue
to be heard
there, but would address detainee issues and hear accounts of pre‑
and
post‑2003
violence from victims and perpetrators.
276.
At the end of
January 2007, Mr Dominic Asquith, British Ambassador to
Iraq,
recorded a
report from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Iraqi
Ba’ath Party
had split,
and a splinter group had formed that wanted to “come back to Iraq,
start a
dialogue,
renounce violence and act politically”.219
It was
hoped that others might be
attracted
to the same strategy.
277.
The IPU
provided advice on “how best to step up and co‑ordinate work
on
reconciliation”
in February 2007.220
It said
that de‑Ba’athification was a “major inhibitor”
of
reconciliation and a cause of grievance in the Sunni
community.
“We have
worked in close consultation with the US to promote a
substantive
discussion
between the main political parties on reforming the
de‑Ba’athification
process.
The aim is to take account of the concerns of all major
communities, help
reduce the
numbers of Iraqis excluded from public life and thus reduce
alienation
and motives
for violence. A number of different draft laws have been provided
by
different
political parties. We are working to help bring these together in a
single
document,
ideally including a sunset clause to bring an end to
de‑Ba’athification
in the
future. A US/UK facilitated version has just gone to President
Talabani with
217
JIC
Assessment, 15 November 2006, ‘Iraq: Risk of Deepening Sectarian
Division’.
218
Minute
McDonald to Banner, 24 November 2006, ‘Iraq Forward Plan’ attaching
Paper, [undated], ‘Iraq:
Forward
Plan’.
219
Email
Asquith to Gelling, 29 January 2007, ‘Call on MFA – Syria,
Neighbouring States’.
220
Paper IPU,
February 2007, ‘Reconciliation’.
52