The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
676.
In his weekly
report on 16 April, Lt Gen Fry commented:
“The
continued debate about the nature of sectarian violence and the
possibility
of civil
war habitually misses a central point: the failure of AQ-I
strategy. The
organisation
has conducted a series of devastating attacks against the
Shia
community …
Whether their motive has been to disrupt the political process
or
provoke
civil war is irrelevant; on either count they have failed. Indeed,
the most
interesting
question is not ‘are we in civil war’ but ‘why are we not in civil
war, given
the
provocations?’ The answer has something to do with the resilience
of Iraqi
society,
residual hope in a better future and the orchestration of popular
response
by senior
leadership … Despite a run of attacks which have killed hundreds
and
destroyed
several places of worship there has been no large scale response
and it
may be that
the larger prize of a Shia government has imposed its own
discipline.
Equally
intriguing is what happens when this constraint no longer
applies.” 323
677.
Discussions
between the UK and US on the need for a new government
continued
on 16 April
when Mr Straw and Secretary Rice spoke by
telephone.324
678.
Mr Straw
was “very worried indeed about the endless delays” and said
that
“we had
to keep up the pressure on the Iraqis, though the levers we had
were limited”.
He and
Secretary Rice agreed to make more phone calls to Iraqi
politicians.
679.
At DOP(I) on
20 April, Mr Straw summarised the latest developments
on
680.
Although there
was agreement on the candidates for President and Vice
President,
the nominee
for Prime Minister was yet to be agreed. In discussion it was
observed that
the
reasserting “the writ of government over ‘the street’” was becoming
critical.
681.
Dr Reid
reported that the readiness assessment for handover in Muthanna
and
Maysan had
been downgraded to “amber” by a senior US military officer on the
basis
of “political
uncertainty at the centre” and the risk of “the Sadrists causing
problems
in the
South”.
682.
Dr Reid
considered that there were “real political risks” to any delay;
local Iraqi
politicians
and the public would be frustrated when it became clear that an
assessment
of
readiness had been overturned. There was also a risk of Shia
resentment if the
Kurdish
provinces in the North were handed over first.
683.
Mr Blair
agreed with Dr Reid’s assessment and thought that concerns
would
be largely
resolved by the anticipated appointment of capable Ministers of
Interior
and Defence.
323
Minute Fry
to PSO/CDS, 16 April 2006, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (207): 16 April
2006’.
324
Note Straw
to Sheinwald, 16 April 2006, Rice call – Sunday 16 April 2006
6.00PM’.
325
Minutes, 20
April 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
600