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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
130.  Baroness Amos reiterated the point on 2 July, after her visit to Iraq. She told
Mr Blair:
“The overwhelming – and immediate – priority is security … the situation appears
to be worsening by the day.” 85
131.  The FCO and DFID carried out a joint security assessment of Baghdad and Basra
between 29 June and 3 July.86
132.  Mr Peter Millett, Head of FCO Security Strategy Unit (SSU), set out the key
conclusions to Mr Collecott:
“We are failing to meet our duty of care to both FCO staff and those seconded
to CPA through the FCO. The security situation is extremely dangerous and the
CPA security resources are inadequate. The majority of secondees need to travel
outside the secure zone where the threat is high and there is little or no control of
the streets. The rules require secondees to travel in soft‑skinned vehicles escorted
by US military vehicles. This makes them extremely vulnerable since the US military
are the target of daily attacks. The alternative to military escorts is a two‑car convoy
with ‘shooters’, ie armed escorts. There are not enough military personnel, so UK
secondees are being asked to handle weapons, which does nothing to enhance
their security.” 87
133.  Mr Millett listed the steps needed to allow CPA secondees to operate “effectively
and safely” in Baghdad:
a security manager in Iraq “to brief new arrivals, keep them up to date on
security incidents, manage security assets (vehicles, flak jackets etc) and act
as a focal point for communications”;
a fleet of vehicles able to operate with or without US military escorts;
a team of armed escorts to accompany secondees outside the secure zone; and
a radio communications system to allow secondees to stay in touch with the
security manager when outside the secure zone.
134.  Implementation of the package required:
agreement on the detail with DFID, which was already introducing better
transport and equipment for its secondees;
a calculation of the number of journeys required each week and therefore the
number of vehicles and escorts needed;
ordering vehicles for early delivery;
85  Letter Amos to Blair, 2 July 2003, [untitled].
86  Minute Gillett to Brewer, 5 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Joint FCO/DFID Security Assessment Visit 29th June
to 3rd July’.
87  Minute Millett to Collecott, 7 July 2003, ‘Iraq Security’.
266
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