The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
50.
The paper
stated that President Bush was letting US officials in Baghdad
“make the
running”,
and recommended that the UK focus its effort with the President on
a few key
areas where
Washington could make a difference, including ensuring that the US
did not
take
reconstruction in the South for granted.
51.
The paper
retained the three reconstruction objectives that DOP had agreed
on
15 July (a
functioning Iraqi Government, reconstruction programmes funded by
others
delivering
quickly and well, and a reduction in subsidies and an agreed IMF
programme
leading to
debt relief by December 2004).
52.
Mr Phillipson
passed the IPU paper to Mr Blair, after discussing it
with
Sir Nigel Sheinwald.23
Mr Phillipson’s
covering minute stated that the IPU paper was
“too vague”,
did not reflect the “loss of control” in Basra and elsewhere, and
did not offer
a clear way
forward. He recalled that Mr Blair had asked for the
“unvarnished truth so
that we can
engage in a frank discussion about how we can help the IIG restore
control”.
53.
Mr Phillipson
recommended that a new paper should be commissioned, broken
into
three
sections:
•
how to
ensure that the elections took place, on time, in January
2005;
•
how the
Sunni triangle could be brought “back under control”;
and
•
how order
could be restored in Basra.
54.
Mr Phillipson
continued that one aspect of the effort to bring the Sunni triangle
back
under
control should be “a short-term
programme of intensive reconstruction to make a
visible
impact to people’s lives – a Sunni outreach
programme”.
55.
Mr Blair
set out his analysis of the issues in a note to Sir Nigel
Sheinwald,
Mr Phillipson,
Mr Jonathan Powell (No.10 Chief of Staff) and a junior member
of his
No.10 staff
on 29 August.24
He
wrote:
“Our
strategy is fine in one sense: Iraqiisation of security and support
for the
democratic
political process. The problem is that the urgency of the situation
may
overwhelm
us and make our timelines for Iraqiisation naïve.
“The fact
is Allawi needs help now; and
there has to be a clear sense of our gripping
the
situation now.”
56.
Mr Blair
identified nine immediate actions, including:
•
providing
Prime Minister Allawi with “first-class political, media and
strategic
capability
… now”, drawing on “the best home-grown Iraqi talent” supported
by
“our own
people” who should be “hand-picked” immediately;
23
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 27 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next
Steps’.
24
Minute
Prime Minister to Sheinwald, 29 August 2004, ‘Iraq’.
206