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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
50.  The paper stated that President Bush was letting US officials in Baghdad “make the
running”, and recommended that the UK focus its effort with the President on a few key
areas where Washington could make a difference, including ensuring that the US did not
take reconstruction in the South for granted.
51.  The paper retained the three reconstruction objectives that DOP had agreed on
15 July (a functioning Iraqi Government, reconstruction programmes funded by others
delivering quickly and well, and a reduction in subsidies and an agreed IMF programme
leading to debt relief by December 2004).
52.  Mr Phillipson passed the IPU paper to Mr Blair, after discussing it with
Sir Nigel Sheinwald.23 Mr Phillipson’s covering minute stated that the IPU paper was
“too vague”, did not reflect the “loss of control” in Basra and elsewhere, and did not offer
a clear way forward. He recalled that Mr Blair had asked for the “unvarnished truth so
that we can engage in a frank discussion about how we can help the IIG restore control”.
53.  Mr Phillipson recommended that a new paper should be commissioned, broken into
three sections:
how to ensure that the elections took place, on time, in January 2005;
how the Sunni triangle could be brought “back under control”; and
how order could be restored in Basra.
54.  Mr Phillipson continued that one aspect of the effort to bring the Sunni triangle back
under control should be “a short-term programme of intensive reconstruction to make a
visible impact to people’s lives – a Sunni outreach programme”.
55.  Mr Blair set out his analysis of the issues in a note to Sir Nigel Sheinwald,
Mr Phillipson, Mr Jonathan Powell (No.10 Chief of Staff) and a junior member of his
No.10 staff on 29 August.24 He wrote:
“Our strategy is fine in one sense: Iraqiisation of security and support for the
democratic political process. The problem is that the urgency of the situation may
overwhelm us and make our timelines for Iraqiisation naïve.
“The fact is Allawi needs help now; and there has to be a clear sense of our gripping
the situation now.”
56.  Mr Blair identified nine immediate actions, including:
providing Prime Minister Allawi with “first-class political, media and strategic
capability … now”, drawing on “the best home-grown Iraqi talent” supported by
“our own people” who should be “hand-picked” immediately;
23  Minute Phillipson to Prime Minister, 27 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Next Steps’.
24  Minute Prime Minister to Sheinwald, 29 August 2004, ‘Iraq’.
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