6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
1201.
On 21 March,
Ms Short explained to Mr Boateng that reconstruction costs
would
need to be
considered in the longer term, “once the post-conflict situation is
clearer and
we have an
IFI-led needs assessment”.512
The aim
should be “to have most of the bill
paid from
the proceeds of sales of Iraqi oil and support from the
IFIs”.
1202.
The time taken
to complete the UN/World Bank Joint Needs Assessment
(JNA)
for Iraq
and the implications for UK planning and Iraq’s post-conflict
reconstruction are
addressed
in Section 10.1.
1203.
On 21 March,
Mr Cannon sent Mr Blair a background note for the
Ministerial
meeting on
post-conflict issues scheduled for that afternoon.513
Mr Cannon
summarised
the
Straw/Hoon position on the scale of the UK’s medium-term military
effort:
•
that the US
be told now that drawdown of the UK military effort to around
one-
third by
the autumn represented the upper limit of the UK
contribution;
•
that the UK
would seek partners for Phase IV, but the MOD and FCO were
not
optimistic
about the prospects for success; and
•
that the US
planned an Iraq-wide transitional administration and “the
possibility
of our
taking over civil administration in a ‘British sector’ has fallen
away”.
1204.
Mr Cannon
attached an FCO paper on areas of agreement and
disagreement
with the US
on a post-conflict resolution. He explained that:
“The
Americans want the Coalition to set the IIA up: we think it would
have more
legitimacy
with the UN playing a lead role. The Americans have just shown us
a
draft SCR
enshrining their ideas: we doubt that it will run in the Security
Council. The
attached
FCO paper sets out where we agree and disagree with the Americans:
to
close the
gap it recommends initially that the Foreign Secretary write to
Colin Powell
… and if
necessary you talk through the basic principles with President
Bush.”
1205.
Mr Cannon
also reported that problems with DFID/MOD co-operation
on
humanitarian
operations “appear to be falling away”.
1206.
Post-conflict
co-operation between DFID and the MOD, including reports
of
friction
between military and DFID personnel in the UK AO, is addressed in
Section 10.1.
1207.
After the
Ministerial meeting on post-conflict issues on 21
March,
Mr Rycroft
informed the FCO and the MOD that Mr Blair agreed to the
Straw/Hoon
recommendations,
subject to further urgent advice on the size of any UK sector,
the
duration of
the UK commitment and the exit strategy.514
Mr Rycroft’s
letter was copied
to the
Treasury, DFID, the Cabinet Office, SIS and Sir Andrew
Turnbull.
512
Letter
Short to Boateng, 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq Humanitarian Funding:
Reserve Claim’.
513
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 21 March 2003 [wrongly dated 20 March
2003], ‘Iraq:
Post-Conflict
Issues’.
514
Minute
Rycroft to McDonald and Watkins, 21 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Contribution to
Post-Conflict
Iraq’.
525