The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“The major
causes of death before the invasion were myocardial
infarction,
cerebrovascular
accidents, and other chronic disorders whereas after the
invasion
violence
was the primary cause of death.”
The study
identified Fallujah as an outlier. Of the households visited in
Fallujah,
44 percent
were temporarily or permanently abandoned. The survey had
nonetheless
completed a
Fallujah sample in which:
“… we
recorded 53 deaths when only 1.4 were expected under the national
pre-war
rate. This
indicates a point estimate of about 200,000 excess deaths in the 3
percent
of Iraq
represented by this cluster. However, the uncertainty in this value
is substantial
and implies
additional deaths above those measured in the rest of the
country.”
On 18
November, Mr Straw briefed the AHMGIR that:
“… he had
issued a Ministerial statement on civilian casualties in response
to
the study
reported by the Lancet. The key points were that the Lancet
findings
were
heavily dependent on the data set they had used and that their
statistical
assumptions
were flawed (and this could be demonstrated if, for example, a
case
study was
made of Fallujah).” 154
Mr Straw’s
statement to Parliament said:
“The
Multi-National and Iraqi forces continue to act so as to minimise
civilian
casualties.
This is despite the fact that the insurgents have shown no
compunction
in using
mosques, schools and hospitals as defensive bases.”155
Mr Straw
quoted alternative casualty figures from the Iraqi Ministry of
Health and from
www.iraqbodycount.org.
Casualty
figures are considered in more detail in Section 17.
300.
In November
2004, Major General Jonathon Riley succeeded Maj Gen Rollo
as
General
Officer Commanding Multi-National Division (South East) (GOC
MND(SE)).
301.
On 1 November,
a CIG considered the current intelligence on Fallujah and
the
potential
impact of military action on the security
situation.156
302.
The CIG judged
that “prospects of a negotiated solution remain poor”. The
US
estimated
that around 3,000 insurgents were still in the city. Of
those:
“Some will
certainly stay and fight but we are unable to judge the potential
size of
this hard
core. Some may fight initially and then disperse. Others may have
already
left the
city. A number will lie low in Fallujah to mount a longer-term
resistance.”
154
Minutes, 19
November 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
155
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 17
November 2004, columns 92WS-95WS.
156
JIC
Assessment, 1 November 2004, ‘Iraq Security:
Fallujah’.
444