The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
circumstances
with which we were not content … Wider questions about the
overall
US plan
still need to be answered, particularly as long as their ability to
achieve
the
necessary strategic effect in the North remains uncertain. And we
need to look
further at
the detail of what is proposed, before reaching a firm view on its
military
and
political merits.”
86.
The plan
assumed a “final UK Divisional Area of Responsibility, including
for
aftermath
operations would be an area bounded by the Iraq/Kuwait border in
the south,
Jalibah
airfield in the west, the Euphrates in the north, and the Shatt
al-Arab waterway
in the east
– a largely Shia area of some 1,600 sq km.”21
87.
The MOD said
further advice would follow “next week”. In the meantime, Mr
Hoon
had
authorised the release from Op FRESCO of some units from 16 Air
Assault Brigade,
and other
measures, “to keep military options open”.
88.
At Cabinet on
9 January, Mr Hoon told his colleagues that no decisions had
been
taken to
launch military action.22
Nor had the
US finalised its military planning. Some
changes to
forces assigned to Op FRESCO, to provide an emergency
fire-fighting
capability
during the firefighters’ strike, would be necessary to keep options
open.
89.
Mr Blair
concluded that the future behaviour of Saddam Hussein in
responding
to UN
pressure was “unpredictable”. The UK was “right to continue with
its military
preparations”.
It should also maintain the focus on the fight with international
terrorism
and
preventive measures at home. Media reports of a rift within the
Cabinet were
“nonsense”.
Cabinet the following week would “provide the opportunity for an
in-depth
discussion
of Iraq”.
90.
Lord Turnbull,
Cabinet Secretary from 2002 to 2005, told the Inquiry that
“the
presentation
to … Cabinet was still – nothing was inevitable. We are pressing
the UN
option. No
decisions on military action, whereas you can see that, at another
level,
the
decisions on military action were hardening up quite
considerably.”23
91.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit advised Mr Hoon on 14 January about the potential
damage
to key
aspects of the wider US/UK relationship in the foreign and security
field
if the UK
failed to participate in a US-led military operation.
92.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit wrote to Mr Hoon on 14 January drawing out how the US
“would
react if
HMG failed to go along with the United States in the event that
they decided
to use
military force against Iraq without a further enabling UNSCR
[United Nations
Security
Council resolution]”.24
While it
was “unwise to attempt to calibrate precisely”
21
The figure
of 1,600 sq km was used repeatedly in policy and briefing papers
during January and
February
2003. This was mistaken. It should have been approximately 16,000
sq km.
22
Cabinet
Conclusions, 9 January 2003.
23
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, page 15.
24
Minute
Tebbit to Secretary of State [MOD], 14 January 2003, ‘Iraq: What
If?’.
400