The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
304.
In a minute to
Mr Blair in June 2003 Mr Scarlett wrote that, following
Mr Blair’s
announcement
on 3 September, the structure of the dossier had been
discussed
between Sir
David Manning, Mr Campbell and himself and their respective
teams.147
The purpose
of the dossier was “to present a more detailed account of Iraqi
capabilities
to be
placed in the wider context”.
“Unlike the
previous drafts, it would refer specifically to intelligence
material. It
was agreed
that since this would now be an intelligence-based document I, as
JIC
Chairman,
rather than OD Secretariat would be in charge of the process.
These
agreements
were set out in detail in Alastair’s note to me of 9 September
…”
306.
Mr Scarlett
added that the drafting of the revised document was co-ordinated
by
Mr Miller,
“working with representatives of Departments, including DIS, SIS,
GCHQ,
and FCO”.
The draft had been discussed at “two meetings of two to three hours
each”
and there
had been “numerous exchanges of drafts and constant consultation
between
the experts
concerned”. The intelligence Agencies had agreed to the involvement
of
Mr Daniel
Pruce, a Press Officer in No.10, and Mr Williams and others
from the FCO
Press
Office. JIC members were asked to consult Ministers during the
drafting process
“as
appropriate”.
307.
Mr Scarlett
also wrote:
“The aim
was to ensure that the public assessment deployed the
intelligence
effectively,
taking account of the reliability of the information and the
demands
of source
protection.”
308.
Mr Scarlett
told the Hutton Inquiry that he had had a discussion with
Mr Campbell
before the
meeting on 9 September to say that:
“… it was
very important that only one person and one unit had ownership
and
command and
control of this exercise, that that should be me, that I wanted it
stated
clearly in
writing; and I wanted that to be the outcome of the meeting
…”148
309.
Mr Blair
told the Hutton Inquiry:
“… the
whole purpose of having the JIC own this document was in order
to
provide the
absolute clarity and certainty … that in the end they were
perfectly
happy with
this. And I think it was … it was essential that anything we said
…
in the
dossier we could hand on heart say: this is the assessment of the
Joint
Intelligence Committee.”149
147
Minute
Scarlett to Prime Minister, 4 June 2003, ‘September 2002 Iraq
Dossier’.
148
The Hutton
Inquiry, public hearing, 23 August 2003, pages 56-57.
149
The Hutton
Inquiry, public hearing, 28 August 2003, pages 18-19.
172