The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
111.
Mr Blair told
the Inquiry:
“… I think
I would fairly describe our policy … as doing our best, hoping for
the best,
but with a
different calculus of risk assessment … up to September 11, we
thought
there was a
risk but we thought it was worth trying to contain it. The crucial
thing
after
September 11 is that the calculus of risk changed.”61
112.
Mr Blair
added: “after September 11, our view, the American view,
changed
113.
Mr Blair
stated that his:
“… primary
consideration … was to send an absolutely powerful, clear
and
unremitting
message that … if you were a regime engaged in WMD, you
had
114.
In the UK,
pursuit of agreement in the Security Council for
improvements
in the
sanctions regime for Iraq was seen as key to both sustaining the
policy
of containment
and to removing an impediment to securing a coalition for
action
against
international terrorism.
115.
The FCO
proposed amending the UK draft resolution to address
the
perception that it imposed additional obligations on Iraq’s
neighbours
to enforce
sanctions.
116.
The background
to the UK’s pursuit of an improved economic sanctions regime
for
Iraq is set
out in Section 1.2.
117.
Following a
meeting to “discuss the options available for dealing with the
UK’s
draft UNSCR
[UN Security Council resolution} and the best way forward in the
light
of
terrorist attack in the US”, Mr Tom McKane, the Deputy Head of OD
Sec, advised
Sir David
Manning:
“The
Cabinet Office Assessments Staff reported that Saddam Hussein
was
comfortable
and in control. He had no desire for a confrontation but could
change
his stance
if the security situation changed in the North or if a new
resolution was
passed
which brought with it tighter controls on imports and exports.
Currently his
position is
not being challenged …
“… there
was no intelligence of an Iraqi link to the terrorist attacks in
the US last
week. But
the Iraqis were nervous of being blamed for the attack. There
were
indications
of the dispersal of Iraqi military assets. Saddam Hussein had
urged
the US
to exercise restraint.”64
61
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 7.
62
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 9.
63
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 24.
64
Minute
McKane to Manning, 18 September 2001, ‘Iraq
Stocktake’.
332