The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Our
judgement in February was that a decision to move away from
patrolling the
south would
make it more difficult to sustain the necessary political support
for the
northern
No-Fly Zone. That remains our view.
“Overall,
our continued collective judgement is that there remains an
unacceptably
high risk
that, in the event that we ceased patrolling the southern No-Fly
Zone,
extreme
humanitarian distress would result on a scale comparable to that
which
led to a
grave humanitarian crisis and the establishment of the Zones in
1991
and
1992.”
334.
Addressing
Lord Williams’ request that officials “should continue to seek
to
establish
whether alternatives methods [to the NFZs] to achieve our
objectives could be
identified”,
Mr McKane stated:
“… the MOD
has conducted a comprehensive review to inform the policy
dialogue
we have
been engaged in with the new US Administration. After our own
careful
and
detailed scrutiny, no other arrangements that would obviate the
need to conduct
regular
patrols over Iraqi territory have been identified.”
335.
Mr McKane
confirmed that the need “to avoid incidental loss of civilian
life,
injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects” remained a key concern
for coalition
commanders
in the planning and implementation of attacks.
336.
Mr Brummell
responded on 25 July.183
Noting that
there was no change to the
assessment
of 8 June, he wrote:
“As
discussed, the new Attorney General will wish to consider in the
near future the
issues
relating to the legal basis for the conduct of operations in the
NFZs, having
regard in
particular to your update … I shall revert to you as soon as he
has
done
so.”
337.
The following
day, Mr Hoon received advice on a possible large-scale attack
by
US forces
on the Iraqi air-defence system, in response to continuing Iraqi
attacks on
coalition
aircraft in the NFZs.184
The advice
stated that the MOD was not yet in a position
to consult
Law Officers, but “there were strong grounds for believing that
they would
have
difficulty with an attack of this scale”. A manuscript comment to
Mr Hoon from his
Private
Office in the margin of the advice stated that the FCO and No.10
were “both in
the
picture”.
338.
It is not
clear whether Mr Brummell was aware that the US was considering
those
strikes
when he wrote to Mr McKane.
183
Letter
Brummell to McKane, 25 July 2001, ‘Iraq’.
184
Minute
Palmer to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 26 July 200, ‘Iraq:
Possible RO4’.
256