4.4 | The
search for WMD
•
the DIS
Battlefield Intelligence Recovery Team;
•
the Joint
Forces Interrogation Team;
•
7630
(HUMINT) Squadron of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force;
•
a Document
Exploitation Team.
112.
Mr Howard
explained that other possible contributions were being
investigated
“as a
matter of urgency”.
113.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office informed Sir David Manning on 28 April
that:
“The
Defence Secretary has agreed that we should respond positively to a
US
request to
provide a military … Chief of Staff for the ISG, and that we should
assign
to the ISG
UK specialist WMD related units, amounting initially to some
30-40
personnel,
already in theatre or about to arrive. We are also looking at
dedicating
other
analytical expertise (including a Porton Down52
mobile
laboratory and
ex‑UN
inspectors) to the ISG effort. The US Commander of the ISG (Major
General
Keith
Dayton) anticipates taking full command around 30 May, though
many US
and UK
elements of the ISG should be in operation well before then … There
are
considerable
variations of view in the US on timescales. General Dayton is
talking in
terms of
six months. Others see the process taking two years or
more.”53
114.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office explained that there was “a complex process” to
go
through to
ensure assets already in theatre before the ISG was established
were put to
best use.
Maj Gen Dayton was discussing the issue with CENTCOM. A UK team led
by
Mr Howard
would do the same with AM Burridge the following week.
115.
Mr Howard
reported the outcome of his visit to the ISG planning team in
Kuwait
and the
site of the future ISG Survey Analysis Centre in Qatar to
Mr Bowen on 2 May.54
Mr Howard
identified security and logistic support as the main constraints on
increasing
the WMD
effort in theatre. WMD activity had to compete with other high
priorities,
including
support for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA).
116.
Mr Howard
stated that he had “found no lack of commitment or urgency in
respect
of WMD
exploitation” and there was “an element of resentment that
Washington and
London did
not recognise the scale of the current effort”.
117.
Asked by US
personnel whether UK political, legal and media opinion
would
be
satisfied if nothing was found and the case for military action
rested on the fact
that Saddam
Hussein retained the expertise and could have built a WMD
capability,
Mr Howard
had responded that he thought not:
52
The UK
chemical and biological defence establishment at Porton Down,
Wiltshire.
53
Letter
Williams to Manning, 28 April 2003, ‘Iraq WMD Detection and
Elimination’.
54
Letter
Howard to Bowen, 2 May 2003, ‘Iraq: WMD Exploitation: The View
From Theatre’.
447