6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
517.
A revised
draft was prepared, but not shared with the US.221
518.
UK/US
discussion of the post-conflict financing of Iraqi reconstruction
is described
in Sections
10.1 and 10.2.
519.
The stated
aim of the UK delegation to the US inter-agency Rock Drill
on
21 and
22 February was to encourage the US to draw the conclusion that the
job
of
administering Iraq was too large for the US, that a large Coalition
was the key
to success,
and that this could only be achieved by securing UN authorisation
for
Phase
IV.
520.
Instead,
the Rock Drill only confirmed the scale of the shortcomings in
US
post-conflict
planning, including the deficiencies of ORHA, and the continuing
gap
between UK
and US positions on the role of the UN.
521.
Sectorisation
remained unresolved after the Rock Drill.
522.
On 19
February, the Chiefs of Staff discussed post-conflict planning in
the
context of
the forthcoming US Rock Drill, an inter-agency rehearsal for
post-conflict
administration
convened by Lt Gen Garner and scheduled for 21 and 22
February.222
The FCO
(Mr Ehrman), the Cabinet Office (Mr Bowen), SIS, Maj Gen
Cross and, for
the first
time, DFID (Dr Brewer) and the IPU (Mr Chilcott) were
present.
523.
Lt Gen Reith
reported that Mr Blair wanted:
“… an
exemplary aftermath but [was] not committed to any particular size
of UK
AOR pending
further advice on objectives, capability and capacity to sustain.
It was
… unclear
who the US anticipated placing as sector leaders given that few
other
nations
would be able to support the task within three months. Therefore,
there may
be an
unsupportable expectation that the UK would control a relatively
large area.
Pragmatically,
however, aftermath operations would commence locally
whenever
and
wherever hostilities ceased, not necessarily coincident with any
plan.
“The FCO
view was that other nations should be involved as soon as possible
and
that early
commitment to any nascent US sector plan should be avoided
…
“The UK
line to take at the Rock Drill would be the commitment in principle
to the
immediate
involvement in aftermath ops but not yet to any long-term plan,
noting the
PM’s wish
to exert maximum influence in aftermath planning. Clarity was
needed on
the
proposed command chain in Phase IV and whose political and legal
authority
would
prevail.”
221
Manuscript
comments Manning and Drummond on Email Heywood to Banerji, Manning,
Powell and
Adonis, 3
March 2003, ‘Financing the Reconstruction of Iraq’ attaching Paper
[unattributed], ‘Financing the
Reconstruction
of Iraq’.
222
Minutes, 19
February 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
401