The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

1317. Mr Hoon also announced arrangements for the first call‑out of Reservists

in support of possible operations against Iraq and the deployment of “a number

of additional vessels and units later this month, which will represent a significant

amphibious capability”, including the headquarters 3 Commando Brigade, and 40 and

42 Commandos “with all supporting elements”.

1318. Mr Hoon concluded:

“None of that means that the use of force is inevitable … no decision has been taken

to commit those forces to action … But … as long as Saddam’s compliance with

… resolution 1441 is in doubt … the threat of force must remain and it must be a

real one.”

1319. Mr Straw’s and Mr Hoon’s statements are addressed in more detail in Section 3.6.

1320. By the beginning of January 2003, uncertainty about Turkey’s agreement

to the deployment of ground forces had reached a critical point.

1321. Mr Hoon and Mr Blair were advised that there were considerable

uncertainties about the UK role in US plans if Turkey refused transit for ground

forces.

1322. Mr Westmacott reported on 23 December 2002 that the Turkish media was

reporting US requests for a full Turkish commitment to preparations for military action;

and that no decisions appeared to have been taken. There was little public support in

Turkey for a war with Iraq.499

1323. On 24 December, Mr Straw and Secretary Powell discussed the fact that

80 percent of the Turkish public were against any co‑operation with the US/UK on

ground troops.500

1324. Mr Straw and Secretary Powell spoke twice on 30 December.

1325. In their first conversation, Secretary Powell asked where a Turkish refusal to the

deployment of UK forces would leave the UK.501 Mr Straw replied: “in some difficulty” but

he knew there were contingency plans. He would “get back” to Secretary Powell.

1326. Mr Straw and Secretary Powell also discussed the possibility that the military

would be ready to take action but there would be no casus belli.

499 Telegram 481, Ankara to FCO London, 23 December 2002, ‘Turkey/Iraq: More US Pressure’.

500 Letter Straw to Manning, 24 December 2002, ‘Conversation with Powell: Iraq’.

501 Telegram 671 FCO London to Washington, 30 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Conversation

with US Secretary of State, 30 December’.

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