The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Political Group

United Iraqi Alliance/Coalition

Kurdistan Alliance

Iraqi List

Iraqis Party

Turkoman Iraq Front

National Independent Cadres and Elites Party

People’s Union (Communist)

Kurdistan Islamic Group

Islamic Action Organisation in Iraq

National Democratic Alliance

Al-Rafideen National List

Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering

Total:

Seats

140

75

40

5

3

2

1

275

483. In a telephone call with President Bush on 15 February, Mr Blair described the

electoral turnout in Sunni areas as “extraordinary”.261

484. Mr Blair suggested that the elimination of the threat from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

– the most visible part of the insurgency – would make a big difference and offered the

view that:

“Basically we had to reduce the insurgency to the hard core and then eliminate it.”

485. On 16 February, the JIC issued an Assessment of the emerging political landscape

and of key political and security issues.262

486. The JIC assessed that perhaps fewer than 10 percent of voters had probably

turned out in the Sunni heartlands, and only two percent in Anbar province.

Overall turnout was 58 percent.

487. The JIC judged that the UIA was “likely to stick together long enough to decide

on the new Prime Minister and makeup of the Presidency”. Prime Minister Allawi was

unlikely to retain his post.

488. The JIC’s Key Judgements included:

“II. There are already encouraging signs of Shia outreach to the Sunnis, but the test

will be the degree to which the Shia are willing to include them in the Government

and in drafting the Constitution, and the extent to which Sunnis are willing to

261 Letter Phillipson to Owen, 16 February 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s phonecall with President Bush,

15 February: Iraq and Syria/Lebanon’.

262 JIC Assessment, 16 February 2005, ‘Iraq; Post Election Landscape’.

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