9.8 |
Conclusions: The post-conflict period
12.
In each phase,
the UK had dual responsibilities in Iraq: it contributed to the
overall
direction
of the Coalition’s strategy and to those activities which took
place at a national
level, and
also led the international effort in MND(SE), comprising the
provinces of
Basra, Dhi
Qar, Maysan and Muthanna. From the outset, the UK placed
particular
emphasis on
Basra province, and its capital – Iraq’s second city.
13.
This Section
considers the UK’s dual responsibilities in each
phase.
14.
As described
in Section 8, UK forces entered Basra City on the night of 6/7
April
2003 and
rapidly gained control, meeting less resistance than anticipated.
Once
the city
was under its control, the UK was responsible, as the Occupying
Power, for
maintenance
of law and order. Within its predominantly Shia Area of Operations,
the
UK assumed
that risks to Coalition Forces would be lower than in the so-called
“Sunni
triangle”
controlled by the US.
15.
Before the
invasion, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the
Defence
Intelligence
Staff had each identified that there was a risk of lawlessness
breaking out
in Iraq,
and that it would be important to deal with it swiftly. Others,
including Mr Blair,
Sir Kevin
Tebbit (the MOD Permanent Under Secretary) and the Iraq Policy Unit
had
recognised
the seriousness of that risk.
16.
However, the
formal authorisation for action in Iraq issued by Admiral Sir
Michael
Boyce,
Chief of the Defence Staff, on 18 March contained no instruction on
how to
establish a
safe and secure environment if lawlessness broke out as
anticipated.
Although it
was known that Phase IV (the military term for post-conflict
operations)
would begin
quickly, no Rules of Engagement for that phase, including for
dealing with
lawlessness,
were created and promulgated before UK troops entered the
country.
17.
Both before
and during the invasion Lieutenant General John Reith, the
Chief
of Joint
Operations, made the absence of instructions to UK forces covering
what
to
do if faced with lawless behaviour by the Iraqi population in
Basra explicit to the
Chiefs of Staff.
18.
Faced with
widespread looting after the invasion, and without instructions,
UK
commanders
had to make their own judgements about what to do. Brigadier
Graham
Binns,
commanding 7 Armoured Brigade which had taken Basra City, told the
Inquiry
that he had
concluded that “the best way to stop looting was just to get to a
point where
there was
nothing left to loot”.4
4
Private
hearing, 2 June 2010, page 11.
473