The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
US, that
decision must be taken in the expectation that any US/UK forces in
Iraq
will continue
to be a target and spur for insurgency as long as they
remain.”
262.
Lt Gen McColl
ended his report by writing:
“There have
already been two strategic errors in the post war campaign,
the
dissolution
of the Army and de-Ba’athification. Lack of clarity on the timing
of our
intent
beyond the Dec 05 elections would be a third. A clearly defined and
articulated
intent to
withdraw once the mission had been completed in the spring of 06
provides
the most
effective way to separate the insurgents from the mass of the
people.”
263.
A CIG assessed
the security situation in North Babil on 21 October and
reached
similar
conclusions to the DIS.131
It judged
that recent MNF-I attacks against insurgents
there had
disrupted but not significantly weakened them. The majority were
disaffected
local Sunni
Arabs, including former military or other state employees, but
there were
also cells
of hardline Ba’athists, Iraqi Islamist terrorists and possibly
foreign jihadists.
The CIG
judged that the local population would be “more hostile to a UK
presence than
the
population in southern Iraq”.
264.
Mr Hoon wrote
to Mr Blair on 21 October that the Chiefs were “of the
view
that there
is a clear military benefit in carrying out the operation in terms
of reducing the
risk
associated with the proposed ISF/US Fallujah
operation”.132
Mr Hoon
indicated that
he intended
to accept the Chiefs’ recommendation and to announce it that
afternoon
to Parliament.
265.
In preparation
for a discussion of the deployment at Cabinet later that
morning,
Mr Blair
asked for “a better explanation … of why the US Army cannot take on
the task
proposed
for the Black Watch”.133
266.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald provided a brief which explained that although
there
were large
numbers of US troops in Iraq, many were providing logistical
support; the
Black Watch
provided the sort of armoured capability to be a like-for-like
replacement
in North
Babil.
267.
At Cabinet Mr
Blair explained that it was necessary to conduct a
“clearance
operation”
in Fallujah in the coming weeks in order to enable Iraqi elections
to
proceed.134 The
deployment of the Black Watch to North Babil was recommended
by
the British
military. For the Black Watch, “the danger to which they would be
exposed
was not
qualitatively different from that which they had experienced to
date in their
current
tour”.
131
JIC
Assessment, 21 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Security Situation in North
Babil’.
132
Letter Hoon
to Blair, 21 October 2004, ‘Deployment of UK forces to the North
Babil region’.
133
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 20 October 2004, ‘Iraq: North
Babil’.
134
Cabinet
Conclusions, 21 October 2004.
438