15.1 | Civilian personnel

threats.253 Those services could be sourced from private contractors after the military

drawdown, though at a lower “level of service” and with increased risk to civilian staff.

The UK had spent £19.2m on life support (including £16m on security) in 2004/05. The

cost to source those services from private contractors would be at last 80 percent higher.

365. On 29 September, after a further IED attack on a US convoy travelling on a route

being considered by the British Embassy Office Basra for road transfers to Kuwait,

Sir Michael Jay agreed to the temporary withdrawal of five FCO and contracted staff

from Basra.254

366. On 30 September, Mr Straw’s Private Office sent No.10 joint FCO/MOD/DFID

advice on the implications for UK policy of the 17 September “Jameat incident”, when

two UK soldiers in Basra killed one Iraqi police officer and wounded another, and were

detained by the Iraqi authorities (see Section 9.4).255 Mr Straw’s Office advised that

paper had been agreed by officials, but had not yet been seen by Mr Straw. The joint

paper stated:

“For FCO, DFID and OGD personnel to operate out of Basra will … require an air

bridge (similar to the one in Baghdad) from the Consulate General to Basra airport.

…

“We will need to allocate more resources, which might include military

resources, to security. The next week, and possibly months, are likely to be rough.

Attacks on us are becoming more sophisticated. We will need to protect our staff.”

367. A manuscript comment by a No.10 official on an advance copy of the paper

shown to Mr Blair stated: “John Reid does not want this [additional military resources

for civilian security].” 256

368. General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff (CGS), visited Iraq in early

October.257 His report of the visit referred to the pressure on the helicopter support fleet

and the air bridge: “we really need to take stock of our AT [air transport] capability in the

round, especially in light of our impending commitment to Afghanistan”.

369. In October 2005, Dr Reid sought approval from Mr Des Browne, Chief Secretary

to the Treasury, to procure a counter‑measure to the threat posed to UK troops by IEDs

(see Section 14.1).258

253 Paper [draft] [unattributed], 27 September 2005, ‘The Consequences of Operational Transition for

Civilian Activities in Southern Iraq: A paper for DOP(I) 20 October 05’.

254 Manuscript comment Jay, 29 September 2005, on Minute Iraq Operations Unit [junior official] to

PS/PUS [FCO], 27 September 2005, ‘Basra Security Situation’.

255 Letter Hayes to Quarrey, 30 September 2005, ‘Iraq: Basra’ attaching Paper FCO/MOD/DFID,

30 September 2005, ‘South‑East Iraq: impact of security incident in Basra’.

256 Manuscript comment Quarrey on Minute [draft] FCO/MOD/DFID, 30 September 2005, ‘Iraq: Basra’.

257 Minute CGS to CDS, October 2005, ‘CGS visit to Iraq: 10‑13 Oct 05’.

258 Letter Reid to Browne, 31 October 2005, ‘Iraq UORs: M*’.

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