The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
116.
Despite that
statement, and the significant changes on the ground (including
the
deterioration
in the security situation and the transition from Occupation to a
sovereign
Iraqi
Government), DFID did not undertake any further, structured
strategic reviews of its
engagement
in Iraq.
117.
The focus on
the South continued during 2004 and 2005, driven by
the
Government’s
assessment that the South was not a priority for the US, the lack
of
funding
from the central Iraqi Government, and the continuing absence of
other donors,
the World
Bank and UN.
118.
Second, from
October 2005, when DFID indicated that it would refocus on
building
the
capacity of the Iraqi Government in Baghdad. Existing projects in
the South
would
continue to completion but, given the security situation, no new
projects would
be
started.
119.
The Inquiry
considers that DFID missed several opportunities to
address
hard,
strategic questions over the scale and focus of its programme in
Iraq and the
contribution
that it could make to achieving broader UK objectives. Addressing
those
questions
did not necessarily require a formal review of the Country
Assistance Plan,
but did
require a structured process which:
•
included a
comprehensive assessment of the political, economic and
social
context in
Iraq;
•
considered
the lessons that DFID had identified and how it would
respond
to them;
•
challenged
DFID’s approach in Iraq;
•
engaged and
reflected the policies and priorities of the Iraqi
Government,
the US and
other international partners; and
•
engaged
other departments, in particular to consider how the
reconstruction
effort
could contribute to broader UK objectives.
120.
Particular
opportunities were:
•
in July
2003, when the UK took on civilian leadership of CPA(South) and
in
doing so
created a “British fiefdom” in the South;
•
in autumn
2003, as the Government sought to respond to deteriorating
security
in the
South by providing support for essential services. DFID should have
taken
steps to
resolve the emerging tension between Ministers’ desire to
accelerate
reconstruction
in the South, and the lack of resources to do so;
•
in October
2004, as the insurgency took hold across Iraq and Mr Blair sought
to
increase
the impact of DFID’s reconstruction effort, in particular in cities
regained
from
insurgent control;
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