The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
about
Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons, the Government stated that
the JIC had
followed
convention: “The Key Judgements section is not intended to be a
summary of
the main
facts in the paper.”
627.
The Government
stated that the September 2002 dossier did present “a
balanced
view of the
Iraq’s CBW capability based on the intelligence available”, but
acknowledged
that
presentation of the 45 minutes issue “allowed speculation as to its
exact meaning”.
628.
The Government
took “careful note” of the ISC conclusion that the inhibiting
effect
of UN
inspections was not fully reflected in JIC Assessments, but
observed that JIC
Assessments
produced in October and December 2002 and in March 2003 did
reflect
the
point.
629.
In response to
the ISC recommendation that, if individuals in the
intelligence
community
formally wrote to their line managers with concerns about JIC
Assessments
those
concerns should be brought to the attention of the JIC Chairman,
the Government
stated that
it was “important to preserve the line management authority of JIC
members
in judging
what should be brought to the attention of the JIC
Chairman”.
630.
After the
publication of the Hutton Report, the FCO also sent its deferred
response
to the
conclusions about the 45 minutes claim and the September dossier in
the 7 July
2003 FAC
report on the decision to go to war in Iraq.347
The FCO
stated:
“We
disagree that the 45 minute claim was given undue prominence.
The
45 minutes
claim came from an established, reliable and long-standing line
of
reporting.
It was included in an early September Joint Intelligence
Committee
(JIC)
Assessment as soon as the underlying intelligence had become
available.
It was
consistent with previous JIC judgements on Iraq’s command and
control
arrangements.
Other issues were given a similar level of prominence in the
dossier:
for example
the judgement that Iraq was building up its weapons of mass
destruction
(WMD)
capability and that it was concealing its programmes.
…
“Had Saddam
used chemical and biological weapons (CBW) munitions during
the
conflict we
have no reason to doubt he could have deployed them in this
timeframe.
…
“We welcome
the Committee’s conclusion that the claims in the September
dossier
were well
founded … We also welcome the conclusion that allegations of
politically
inspired
meddling cannot credibly be established.”
347
Ninth
Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session
2002-2003, The
Decision to go to War in
Iraq, Further
Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs,
Cm6123.
548