6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
899.
On the single
page describing the “Operational Plan”, officials explained
that:
“In view
of DFID’s limited resources, we will retain maximum
flexibility to respond
to changing
scenarios and needs.” It listed
seven actions that were planned or
under way:
•
“Information
Management”: CHAD-OT staff in Kuwait and Jordan were to
collate,
analyse and
disseminate field information. DFID was evaluating the need
to
send staff
to Turkey, Iran and Cyprus, and would retain a limited capacity
to
deploy
assessment teams to localised crisis points.
•
“Humanitarian
Advice/Funding”: CHAD
advice in the field and in London to
inform
policy and funding decisions.
•
“Direct
Support to the UN”: secondment of specialists to support
the
co‑ordination
and information activities of the UN’s Humanitarian
Assistance
Centre
(HIC) and Joint Logistic Centre (UNJLC).
•
“Advice to
the Military/Coalition”: two secondees advising 1 (UK) Div and
one
official in
ORHA, all contributing to DFID’s “information gathering
system”,
and a
further secondment to the National Component HQ in Qatar
under
consideration.
•
“Material
Support”: DFID’s stockpile of non-food items, vehicles and
equipment
brought to
immediate readiness, with some elements positioned in Kuwait
and
elsewhere
in the region.
•
“Direct
Implementation”:
officials ready to assess and undertake limited relief
and
immediate rehabilitation operations through supervised QIPs
“implemented
by our
traditional partners and possibly the UK military. This could
include
building or
repairing critical infrastructure required for the humanitarian
effort.”
•
“Oil-for-Food
Programme”: maintaining and protecting OFF or a
variant
mandated by
the UN.
900.
Ms Short
responded: “Thanks.”376
901.
On 12 March,
Mr Hoon’s Private Office informed No.10 that MOD and
DFID
advisers
had been working together for some time, but that it was only “very
recently”,
with the
decision to deploy a DFID adviser to HQ 1 (UK) Div, that it had
been possible
to engage
in detailed planning for humanitarian operations within the UK
AO.377
“As
a
consequence
our planning is far less mature than we would ideally like.” The
absence of
funding for
1 (UK) Div to undertake humanitarian assistance was of “crucial
concern”.
902.
In a letter
to Mr Blair on 12 March, Ms Short appeared to distance
herself
and her
department from collective responsibility for the UK’s humanitarian
and
reconstruction
effort in Iraq.
376
Manuscript
comment Short on Minute Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs
Department [junior official],
12 March
2003, ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Strategy and Immediate Assistance Plan:
Information Note’.
377
Letter
Williams to Cannon, 12 March 2003, ‘Iraq Post-Conflict
Issues’.
475