The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
748.
Lt Gen
Reith presented two papers to the Chiefs of Staff on 4
March
advocating
an expanded combat role for UK forces. He advised that
the
implications
for Phase IV should be a consideration.
749.
Mr Hoon
and the Chiefs of Staff agreed that the UK should not actively
seek
a wider
role, but should be ready to consider any unsolicited US requests
on
their
merits. Implications for Phase IV operations would be one of a
number of
considerations.
750.
On 4 March, Lt
Gen Reith sent the Chiefs of Staff two papers setting out
proposals
for
employing UK land forces on combat missions with or without “a
dedicated ‘UK
box’” based
on “the agreed 1 (UK) Div AO”. The papers are described in more
detail
751.
Lt Gen Reith
explained that a UK box would “allow UK forces to move first
in
a ground
offensive and thereby set the conditions for the ‘exemplary
performance’
in Phase
IV”, but US resistance to the creation of a UK box would “probably
only
be overcome
by high level intervention”.
752.
In the first
of the two papers, Lt Gen Reith addressed the advantages
and
disadvantages
of “UK ownership of its full AO from the start”. Under the existing
Base
Plan, the
UK AO would expand into space vacated by US forces as they moved
north
and UK
forces would not be able to shape their own Phase IV AOR. Lt Gen
Reith
explained
that one of the contingency plans already worked up by the Land
Component
Command
(LCC) assumed full UK ownership of its AO from the start. There
could be
“no doubt
at all that this represents a far better option for UK forces than
the Base Plan”.
753.
In the second
paper, Lt Gen Reith explained that his forthcoming
meetings
with Lt Gen
McKiernan and others would “almost certainly be the last chance
that
the
operational commanders will have to discuss the plan face to face
before ground
operations
commence”. US commanders were likely to press him on UK
land
contributions
beyond the provisions in the Base Plan.
754.
Lt Gen Reith
put forward two options:
•
“National
focus with limited operational exposure.” The Base Plan,
involving
“operations
within the AO as presently defined, concentrating on
making
the early
transition from Phase III to Phase IV, with an end state defined
as
‘exemplary
performance’ in Phase IV within Basra region”.
•
“Coalition
focus with unconstrained operational exposure.” Among
the
disadvantages
of this approach was a reduction in the number of
troops
328
Minute
Reith to COSSEC, 4 March 2003, ‘Op Telic employment of UK forces’
attaching Paper
CJO,
3 March 2003, ‘Op TELIC Land Options for 1(UK) Armoured
Division – update’ and Paper CJO,
4 March 2003,
‘Op TELIC Land Options for 1(UK) Armoured Divisions – Alternative
Options’.
446