The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Iraq had
not provided UNMOVIC and the IAEA with “the names of all
personnel
currently
and formerly associated with Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear,
and
ballistic
missile programmes and the associated … facilities”.
•
Iraq was
not co-operating “immediately, unconditionally, and actively
with
UNMOVIC and
the IAEA”. It had not answered the outstanding
questions
raised by
UNSCOM when it was forced to withdraw or by the 1999
Amorim
panel (see
Section 1.1).
598.
The list of
unresolved “outstanding issues” included:
•
“Failure to
account adequately for SCUD-type missiles and
components
‘suggests
that these items may have been retained for a
prohibited
missile force’.”
•
“Failure to
explain why Iraq has built a missile test stand at al-Rafah
that
can
accommodate missiles with over four times the thrust of the
prohibited
Al Samoud
missile.”
•
“[A]t least
80 tonnes (in 550 shells and 450 aerial bombs)” of “unaccounted
for”
mustard
gas, and that quantity “could be substantially
higher”.
•
Whether
Iraq had retained “some capability with regard to VX”.
•
Whether
Iraq’s claimed destruction of bulk agent, including anthrax, in
1991
had occurred.
•
Failure to
account for the aircraft associated with the L-29 RPV
programme.
599.
The FCO paper
also stated that Iraq had only:
•
“Partially
met” the requirement for free and unrestricted use of aircraft
“belatedly
and under
pressure”.
•
“Not yet
met” the requirement to destroy Al Samoud missiles and
associated
equipment.
It stated that the programme of destruction had started by
the
deadline
set by UNMOVIC, but suggested it could be stopped “at any
time”.
•
“Partially
met” the requirement not to “take or threaten hostile acts”,
although
it stated
“inspections had been largely incident-free”.
600.
The paper also
identified Iraqi “gestures” which it characterised as
examples
of a “pretence
of co-operation”.
601.
The paper was
sent to all Members of Parliament on 17 March.201
602.
The
statements in the FCO paper about Iraq’s approach to interviews and
its
intimidation
of personnel were based on the UK’s interpretation of the
intelligence
reporting
it had received that Iraq was actively and successfully pursuing a
policy
of
concealing its programmes and deceiving and obstructing the
inspectors.
201
Letter
Straw to Colleagues, 17 March 2003, [untitled] attaching Paper FCO,
15 March 2003,
‘Iraqi Non‑Compliance
with UNSCR 1441’.
502