9.3 | July 2004 to May 2005

566. In addition to the Prime Minister and his three deputies, the ITG included

31 Ministers, six of whom were Sunni, in line with the estimated Sunni proportion of

Iraq’s population.312

567. Mr Asquith commented in his evidence to the Inquiry that the momentum injected

into the political process by the elections was squandered because it took four months

to form the ITG.313

568. Lt Gen Brims told the Inquiry that the delay forming the ITG had created a political

vacuum that had been filled by street violence.314

569. In a telegram dated 6 May, Mr Chaplin outlined the key challenges facing

Prime Minister Ja’afari:

• a progressive handover from the MNF-I to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF);

• improvement in public services;

• managing the economy, including keeping inflation under control;

• progress on the Constitution; and

• managing public expectations.315

570. Mr Chaplin added that the ITG had a clear electoral mandate and some

experienced Ministers, but also a number of serious handicaps, including the risk

of discord within Prime Minister Ja’afari’s political grouping, the possibility that the

Kurdish members of the TNA would seek to have him replaced, and other issues

(such as de-Ba’athification) “which could stoke up tensions within government to the

point of collapse”.

571. Mr Chaplin concluded that “there are reasons to hope that the political imperative

of delivering results, and the awfulness of the alternatives, will force the necessary

compromises to be made”.

572. Mr Chaplin reported on 6 May that there was “a widespread assumption that the

timetable laid down in the Transitional Administrative Law … is too tight, although we

continue to insist that every effort should be made to meet it”.

312 University of Utah Global Justice Project: Iraq, [undated], Government and Legislature – 2003 to date;

The New York Times, 12 May 2005, Q&A: Iraq’s Cabinet.

313 Public hearing, 4 December 2009, page 6.

314 Public hearing, 14 December 2009, page 28.

315 eGram 4045/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 6 May 2005, ‘Iraq: Prospects for the Ja’afari Government’.

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