3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
their
resolve a step at a time, often until his adversary is on the brink
of military
attack … if
he feels he is losing control, and becoming increasingly
politically
confined
and potentially ‘losing’, he can become very dogmatic,
increasingly
impulsive
and extremely non‑compliant.”
32.
In relation to
Saddam Hussein’s perception of risk, the profile stated that
he
was only
likely to identify alternative strategies “once something has
been proved
to
fail outright”.
33.
In terms of
predicting Saddam Hussein’s future behaviour, the profile
stated:
“Saddam
maximises benefits before he minimises costs.” He was:
“… not
aiming to gain extra power or resources but simply to maintain his
current
leadership
position. The assumption that the current situation may increase
his
intent to
take dramatic action, does not, therefore, necessarily
apply.
“Whilst
there is little doubt that Saddam’s behaviour is being influenced
by political
pressure,
there are no compelling indications that he is likely to take
radical or
unpredictable
action. On the contrary, Saddam is currently making decisions
and
adopting
tactics that make his near term behaviour more predictable and
stable
than usual.”
34.
The profile
concluded:
“… [Saddam
still judges there to be some opportunity to derail moves towards
war.]
Whilst his
threat perception remains ‘potential’ Saddam will continue to
pursue a
strategy of
relative compliance, with the main intention of not giving the US
or the
UK any
ground to move against him militarily; provocation at this stage is
therefore
not an
option.
“Many
factors within the next few months might serve to either maintain
Saddam’s
current
threat perception, or give him cause to confirm the inevitability
of an attack.
The UN
resolution is one such factor. If Saddam perceives a semblance of
hope in
the
resolution, the likelihood of him taking precipitate action remains
low. If, however,
the
resolution confirms in Saddam’s mind, the inevitability of an
attack, then he will
have little
motivation to remain compliant.
“In the
longer term, there will come a time where Saddam may decide that a
strategy
to deal
with the potential loss he faces requires him to take radical,
aggressive
action. He
is unlikely to wait until such a threat becomes imminent. Once he
is
confronted
with tangible evidence of an inevitable attack, such as troops on
Iraq’s
borders …
he is likely to conclude that he has no alternative option to
guarantee
his
survival. In this instance he is likely to act quickly, decisively
and whilst he still
maintains
some degree of loyalty within his command structures.”
35.
The profile
was seen by Mr Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of
Staff, and
Sir David Manning,
Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser and Head of the Cabinet
Office
11