Previous page | Contents | Next page
14.1  |  Military equipment (post-conflict)
163.  To meet the immediate requirement of 228 vehicles, the merits of deploying either
Snatch or Tavern were debated including on the grounds of protection, mobility, capacity
and sustainability. The need for climate modifications and communications adaptations
was also considered.
164.  The Group concluded that Snatch was the preferred option because there were
Integrated Logistic Support issues and reliability concerns with Tavern. It acknowledged
that the “protection levels afforded by Snatch may not meet the requirement to counter
the local threat”.
165.  Other solutions considered were:
fitting the in‑service Wolf (a Land Rover variant) or Pinzgauer with appliqué
armour – discounted because of the scarcity of suitable vehicles;
refurbishing the Armoured Patrol Vehicle (APV)1.5 awaiting disposal –
discounted because of the poor mechanical condition of the fleet and the
“political implications” of utilising equipment marked for disposal;
refurbishing Snatch – discounted as an immediate response because of the
timescales and level of technical risk but considered a possible long‑term
solution to Project DUCKBOARD; and
procuring new vehicles – discounted as an immediate response because of
the timescales but considered a valid solution in the medium‑to‑long term.
166.  The Group recommended that:
the deployment of Snatch be taken forward to meet the timescale for the
provision of 228 vehicles for Iraq in four weeks; and
a new vehicle purchase, with protection levels similar to or better than Snatch,
be considered to meet the requirement of enough vehicles for two brigades
within four to six months.
167.  180 Snatch Land Rovers were dispatched from Northern Ireland to Iraq on
11 September.79
168.  An operational analysis for Project DUCKBOARD was produced at the end of
September, making a number of recommendations for further analysis to examine the
requirements for a “Rest Of [the] World” PPV capability.80 That is covered in the Vector
operational analysis later in this Section.
169.  Lt Gen Lamb told the Inquiry that there was a need for “a less aggressive means
to transport people around” but “the need to armour it was self‑evident”.81 Lt Gen Lamb
79  Minute Comd CSS to CSVS IPT, 16 September 2003, ‘SNATCH Deployment from Northern Ireland’.
80  Report DSTL, 31 March 2004, ‘VECTOR Operational Analysis’.
81  Private hearing, 24 May 2010, pages 25‑26.
31
Previous page | Contents | Next page