The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
579.
In its
“main
conclusions”, the dossier
stated:
“Iraq
continues to work on developing nuclear weapons … Uranium has been
sought
from Africa
that has no civil nuclear application …”311
580.
The dossier
stated that the JIC assessed that Iraq had continued its
nuclear
research
after 1998 and “drew attention to intelligence that Iraq had
recalled its nuclear
scientists
to the programme in 1998”. “Since 1998 Iraq had been trying to
procure items
that could
be for use in the construction of centrifuges …”312
581.
In a section
on “Iraq’s nuclear
weapons expertise”, the dossier
stated:
•
The IAEA had
dismantled the physical infrastructure of Iraq’s nuclear
weapons
and removed
the remaining highly enriched uranium, “But Iraq retained,
and
retains
many of its experienced nuclear scientists and technicians who
are
specialised
in the production of fissile material and weapon design.
Intelligence
indicates
that Iraq also retains the accompanying programme
documentation
and
data.”
•
“Intelligence
shows that the present Iraqi programme is almost certainly
seeking
an
indigenous capability to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon
…”
•
“Following
the departure of the inspectors in 1998 there has been
an
accumulation
of intelligence indicating that Iraq is making concerted
covert
efforts to
acquire dual-use technology and material with nuclear
applications.”
•
“Iraq’s
known holdings of processed uranium are under IAEA
supervision.
But there
is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant
quantities
of uranium
from Africa. Iraq has no … legitimate reason to acquire
uranium.”
•
Intelligence
showed that Iraq had attempted to purchase other items that
could
be used in
a nuclear programme, including “repeated attempts covertly
to
acquire a
very large quantity (60,000 or more) of specialised aluminium
tubes”
with a
“potential application in the construction of gas centrifuges used
to enrich
uranium,
although there is no definitive intelligence that it is destined
for a
582.
The judgements
in the dossier about the timelines Iraq would need to
acquire
a nuclear
weapon are addressed earlier in this Section.
311
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
17.
312
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
24.
313
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
pages
24-26.
224