The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
The facts
in the dossier “as a whole” presented a picture of a regime
which
was “so
opposed to international norms of behaviour that it must be
confronted
effectively
now”.
162.
Mr Rycroft
suggested that Mr McKane should develop the
draft.71
163.
Sir David
Manning wrote: “Yes. Let’s see what the response
is.”72
164.
In his
statement for the Inquiry, Mr McKane wrote that
Mr Blair:
“… had
decided the dossier should be ready for publication within weeks,
in
order
to explain publicly why effective action had to be taken to
counter the threat
posed by
Iraq. This is brought out in the draft ‘capping piece’ which I sent
to
165.
Asked about
the origins of the capping note, Mr McKane told the Inquiry
that it
“followed
an exchange with either Sir David Manning or Matthew Rycroft in
which we
agreed that
the draft needed something … which would encapsulate the main
points”.74
166.
Mr McKane
subsequently stated:
“I suppose
what I was doing was trying to answer the question: why should we
take
action now?
So it is related to the shift in approach that was marked by the
meeting
on 23 July
and the greater sense of pace and urgency that was injected
thereafter.”75
167.
Following the
Sedgefield press conference, Dr Michael Williams,
Mr Straw’s
Special
Adviser, wrote to Mr Straw reporting that the Director of the
International Institute
for
Strategic Studies (IISS) had informed him that it would be
publishing its dossier
on the
threat posed by Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction
and past
practices
of deception in relation to UN inspections.76
Dr Williams
thought that it would
“be helpful
in moving towards a more informed debate about Iraq which is long
overdue”.
168.
Commenting on
the draft UK dossier, Dr Williams wrote that he shared
many
of Mr John
Williams’ views:
“The text
I’ve seen is not significantly different from one I saw in late
Spring.
“It is
certainly not a ‘killer’ dossier. The material is often poorly
presented
and would
benefit from professional editing to make it a sharper
assessment.
71
Manuscript
comment Rycroft to Manning, 3 September 2002, on Minute McKane to
Rycroft,
2 September
2002, ‘Iraq’.
72
Manuscript
comment Manning to Rycroft, 3 September 2002, on Minute McKane to
Rycroft,
2 September
2002, ‘Iraq’.
73
Statement,
8 December 2010, page 5.
74
Public
hearing, 19 January 2011, page 83.
75
Public
hearing, 19 January 2011, page 84.
76
Minute
Williams [Michael] to Straw, 3 September 2002, ‘Iraq
Publication’.
144