The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
450.
Mr Cook
stated that Iraq’s military strength was now less than half its
size in 1991;
and,
“Ironically”, it was “only because Iraq’s military forces” were “so
weak that we can
even
contemplate its invasion”. He questioned the threat posed by
Iraq:
“Iraq
probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the commonly
understood
sense of
the term – namely a credible device capable of being delivered
against
a strategic
city target. It probably … has biological toxins and battlefield
chemical
munitions,
but it has had them since the 1980s when US companies sold
Saddam
anthrax
agents and the then British government approved chemical and
munitions
factories.
Why is it now so urgent that we should take military action to
disarm a
military
capacity that has been there for twenty years, and which we helped
to
create? Why
is it necessary to resort to war this week, while Saddam’s ambition
to
complete
his weapons programme is blocked by the presence of UN
inspectors?”
451.
The questions
about Iraq’s capabilities asked by Mr Cook in response to
the
briefing he
had been given by Mr Scarlett on 20 February are set out
earlier in
this Section.
452.
On 17
March, Mr Scarlett addressed the different elements of
Iraq’s
capability,
including Iraq’s actions since the departure of the inspectors in
1998
to pursue
chemical and biological weapons programmes, and Iraq’s activities
to
pursue
enhanced ballistic missiles and other means to deliver
them.
453.
In relation
to Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons capability,
Mr Scarlett
concluded
that the JIC view was clear: Iraq possessed chemical and
biological
weapons,
the means to deliver them, and the capacity to produce
them.
454.
Mr Scarlett
attributed the failure to find any significant evidence of
chemical
and
biological weapons to Iraq’s ability to conceal its activities and
deceive
the inspectors.
455.
On 17 March,
in response to a request from Sir David Manning,
Mr Scarlett
provided
advice on “the strength of evidence showing Saddam’s possession of
WMD”.168
“The
starting point is our knowledge of Iraq’s past WMD programmes.
This
demonstrates
not only large-scale possession of these weapons, and the
readiness
to use
them, but also Saddam’s determination to retain WMD in the face of
military
defeat in
1991 and the subsequent UN inspections. You will recall that much
of his
BW
programme came to light only in 1995, following Kamil’s [Saddam
Hussein’s
son-in-law]
defection. And as UNSCOM demonstrated in 1999, there has never
been
a full and
convincing account of the destruction of Iraq’s
capabilities.”
168
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 17 March 2003, ‘Iraqi WMD: Evidence of
Possession’.
372