9.5 | June 2006 to 27 June 2007

place. Military semantics still offers a refuge, but we must expect the civil war theme

to be a running feature of the editorial pages.”61

82. In Lt Gen Fry’s view, the coalition faced some big decisions about how to address

the problems it faced, namely:

• an entrenched Sunni insurgency, with greater links to AQ; and

• increasing sectarian violence which might be partly prompted by Shia extremists

seeking to exacerbate Sunni alienation in order to avoid the Shia having to share

power.

83. Lt Gen Fry reached two conclusions:

• The point might have been reached where the Global War On Terror and the

Iraq campaign were in conflict, as the campaign against AQ-I was indirectly

helping achieve Shia political ambitions by further alienating the Sunni

community and fuelling their disaffection with the political process.

• There was a need to “rapidly equalise the campaign effect in both communities

by deliberate offensive action against the Shia ‘death squads’”.

84. Mr Blair annotated these conclusions – “quite right”.62

85. On 19 July, at the request of the MOD, the JIC examined changes in the nature

of violence in Iraq.63

86. The JIC’s first Key Judgement was:

“I. The security situation is growing in complexity. In addition to insurgents, local

struggles for political and economic power, sectarian extremists and criminals are

all exploiting declining security. Spiralling sectarian violence is the most immediate

threat to Iraq’s progress. Deteriorating security is outpacing the government’s ability

to respond: violence is at the highest sustained level since April 2003. Most is still

in the Sunni heartlands and Baghdad, but it is also increasing in pockets elsewhere

(including Basra).”

87. The JIC also judged:

“II. A virulent Sunni Arab nationalist insurgency continues. The Multi-National Forces

(MNF) continue to bear the brunt of their attacks. A minority of Sunni insurgents is

engaged in talks with the coalition and the Iraqi government, but the commitment of

the majority of insurgents to a violent campaign is largely undiminished. Intensifying

sectarian violence is strengthening the unwillingness of many to give up their

61 Minute Fry to PSO/CDS, 16 July 2006, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (218): 16 July 2006’.

62 Manuscript comment Blair, on Minute Fry to PSO/CDS, Hybrid, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (218):

16 July 2006’.

63 JIC Assessment, 19 July 2006, ‘Iraq: Insurgency, Sectarianism and Violence’.

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